Tag Archive: Britain

The crisis in school places: is Brexit the quick fix?

With about a month to go before the EU referendum scheduled to take place on 23 June 2016, high-profile Brexiteers keep pushing the line or argument that it is because of the European Union´s (EU) freedom of movement of people that Britain has major problems with its public services, not least health (EU health tourism), housing (being priced out by EU migrants), benefits (EU benefit tourism), education (too few places due to EU immigrant families), etc.

I have already discussed some of the arguments (see links above), so now attention turns to another major public policy concern in the Brexit: education. If it true that the education system is under pressure specifically because of immigration from the EU, then this could be a reason for considering leaving Brexit from the EU.

On the other hand, if the pressures for educational places predate 2004, when the EU immigration to the UK started in earnest, or if EU migration is only one factor among others that are causing the particular problem of pressures for school places, then it is also reasonable to discuss those other issues, thus putting EU immigration in context.

After all, everyone knows that government has ultimate responsibility for securing public goods which the market cannot deliver on its own: where an important public policy gap is diagnosed, it is for government to devote the necessary public funds to correct the market failure. No one is suggesting that Brussels is responsible for education (or housing construction, funding hospitals and clinics, etc.), not even the Brexiteers.

My kingdom for a school place!

In a clear echo of their diagnosis of the nature of the crisis in the health sector (i.e. the NHS is at breaking point because of EU health tourism and similar), the Brexiteers they are once again pressing the crisis button and pointing in the direction of Brussels: the school system is under “huge and unsustainable pressure” from a dramatic rise in the number of children from European migrants’ families. Ms Priti Patel, the pro Leave Employment Minister, echoing her now familiar anti-EU immigration refrain, keeps making comments such as: „These figures show how the EU’s open borders policies, and the uncontrolled immigration that stems from that, is leading to huge and unsustainable pressures on our schools.“

This possibility is deeply troubling for the average British family, so let us try to unpack this issue.

First of all, it is clear that Ms Patel and her bedfellows are not making allegations about the performance of the school system. There, it is clear that educational performance is a long running concern that cannot be pinned on the EU: Britain is responsible for the national curriculum, the schools and the teachers, not the EU. In any case, Britain has a long and proud history of accepting children whose mother tongue is not English and turning them into integrated citizens. Furthermore, the experience of EU migrant’s children has generally been positive in pushing up standards, especially in the urban areas where EU and other migrants tend to concentrate. So instead, the Brexiteers are focusing on the issue of insufficient school places (i.e. the unsustainable pressure bit) and pointing to EU immigration as the reason for the crisis.

So the central question to be asked is: are there sufficient places for school age children in the UK?

The answer is a clear and unequivocal “yes”. At the national level there is a notable surplus of both primary and secondary school places.

While Ms Patel and other Brexiteers are pointing the accusing finger of blame in the direction of EU immigrants, even Migration Watch, an initiative that maintains that immigration is neither properly managed nor sustainable and thus has an impeccable Brexit pedigree, says otherwise:

“There are currently 4.416 million primary school places in England and 4.011 million pupils on school rolls which means there are 434,000 unfilled places. At the moment the number of unfilled places as a percentage of total places is 9.8%…  The current number of secondary school places in England is 3.637 million while the current number of pupils is 3.191 million. This means that there are over 450,000 places currently unfilled. The number of unfilled place as a percentage of total places is currently 12.9%.” (emphasis added, 2014 data).

The real issue is that Britain’s fertility rate combined with immigration has resulted in a projected increase in school age children, which will feed into the school system from 2018 to 2020, as illustrated in the chart below.

So the point is not that there are currently unsustainable pressures but that in the future there might be unsustainable pressures if the British government fails to act. Perhaps this is what Ms Patel actually means, as opposed to what she and the rest of the Leave campaign are implying. Either way, the effect on the average voter can be imagined.

Responding to present or future school place demand is categorically not the responsibility of the EU or of EU citizens who choose lo live in Britain, as is their right to do.

It would be absurd to blame the large numbers of Britons living in France and Spain for causing unsustainable health / housing / education, etc. pressures there. Relatively little of the projected increase in demand for UK school places can possibly be attributed to EU immigrants. Generally speaking, they tend to be younger, better educated and single, factors which tend not to be correlated with large families and thus disproportionate number of school age children. As far as I can tell Britons, including Ms Priti Patel and Mr Nigel Farage, as well non-EU migrants who make-up the majority of the annual immigration to the UK, also find the time to make babies. British children clearly and unequivocally make-up vast majority of the children taking-up places in the schools.

When it comes to forecasts about future school places, it is the responsibility of Ms Priti Patel, Mr Boris Johnson, Mr Michael Gove (former Secretary of State for Education (2010-2014) and previously Shadow Secretary of State for Children, Schools and Families (2007 – 2010)), Mr David Cameron, Mr David Osborne, etc. to ensure that resources are allocated to meet those needs. Since politicians keep on about our children being our future, one would expect them to get on with funding the necessary school places, so as to avoid any future unsustainable pressure from a well-documented surge in school age children. Is this too much to expect of a responsible government and its leading ministers?

Bread today, not tomorrow

It would not be appropriate to suggest that the problem of school places is only about the future: it is also about today. The point is that demand for school places varies from location to location. Some schools are much more attractive than others for the simple reason that some perform much better academically than others. Most parents want to send their children not just to the nearest local school but to the best performing nearest school, since this is likely to affect their educational performance and thus their chances of getting to university and land a good job. That is a perfectly rational desire on their part.

But the result is that in high demand locations/schools, the parents’ first choice of school may or may not work out. The issue is thus not one of not getting a school place, whatever the Brexiteers may imply (though it may come to that in the future), but of getting a place in the school that the parents would prefer their child to attend. The better schools will always attract more demand for school places than they can possibly satisfy. In this context, available primary and secondary school places may not match demand for specific schools in particular parts of the country, especially in urban areas. In some places, it is possible that simply not enough school places are available to cope with demand.

None of this is new, unusual or driven by EU immigration.

Since demand and supply vary across time and space, it is up to central and local government to meet that future demand (based on population projections), as well as current demand in hot spots. This is at the core of governance, which includes taking into account the fact that EU migration not only happens, but has been happening since even before the UK joined in 1973. Nothing new there, though the scale of EU immigration has increased since 2004.  That is nothing new either, so the responsible individuals have had more than enough time to factor it into their planning.

It is up to each local authority not only to ensure that there are sufficient school places, but also to promote parental choice, diversity and fair access.

If there are access hot spots in particular locations, would you blame the parents for choosing to live in those parts of the country or wanting to send their kids to be best possible schools? If there are particular areas with insufficient school places, would you blame people for still wanting and expecting their children to get a school place? If there are problems, I would point to central and local government for failing to act according to the population forecasts and patterns of demand. There is absolutely no rocket science and there are no sudden unexpected factors involved. The nationality of the children or parents involved is irrelevant, except if some choose to make a political issue out of it.

The Department for Education is tasked with making capital funding available to establish new schools and maintain existing ones. For their part, local authorities argue that they cannot cope with the funding pressures: in 2014, 3 out of 4 claimed that capital funding for new places was insufficient. The National Union of Teachers argues that where there is a school places crisis, it is caused by the curtailment of local authorities’ powers and the centralisation of decisions over where to build new schools.

I can see that a problem exists in the policy nexus between the Department of Education, local authorities and the National Union of Teachers. What I fail to see is how Ms Priti Patel can attribute blame to EU immigrants when she and her fellow Brexiteers, such as Mr Gove, have systematically failed to perform their day job. It is British politicians and ministers who are paid to assess, plan and fund school places (and housing and health services and infrastructure and all the rest of public goods that only government policy can deliver) according to changing patterns of national, regional, local and micro demand. This applies equally to all public services.

Surely Ms Patel and Mr Gove can understand this point and their own role in the future availability or otherwise of primary and secondary school places? But fear not, it is not too late. There are still a few years before the looming school place crisis hits the school system (see chart above), so they may as well just get on with building the necessary schools, rather than blaming all and sundry for national and local politicians’ own policy failings. It is not just a bit too convenient to push the blame for public policy failures to someone else?

Scapegoating immigrants is never a pretty sight and can be downright dangerous.

With her background, Ms Priti Patel should understand this point much better than most even if the EU referendum, so dear to her ideological heart, may be at stake. I acknowledge that for someone with an immigration background in theReferendum Party and now the Conservative Party, talking tough about EU immigration may be some sort of mark of distinction, but she has to be  fair and reasonable in apportioning blame for the problem. As far as I am concerned, that particular bar is set even higher for senior members of the British government with constant access to the media. With power should come at least a sense of proportion, if not responsibility. The longer the Brexit debate goes on and the more the polls shift slowly towards Remaining, the more shrill the Brexit case become. The same could be said about the Remain campaign to some extent, though the focus is different.

One is tenuous and based on the premise that EU immigrants are to blame for almost all the public policy problems (housing, education, health, etc.). The other talks principally about the economic consequences of leaving on taxes, wages, pensions, house prices, jobs, etc.  This claim and counter claims muddy the waters and confuse the public prior to what will undoubtedly be the most important vote for a generation. However, this decision cannot possibly be reduced to just the issue of EU immigration, no matter how emotive it may be. Apart from anything else, British people returning home to the UK, together with non-EU immigration, constitute a larger portion of annual net migration than does EU immigration.

Returning to the issues of school places, let us keep things simple: any way you choose to look at it, Brexit cannot possibly be a quick fix for the forthcoming crisis in school places at primary and secondary school level. The surge in school age children is coming because of fertility rates: that means first and foremost Britons, as well as non-EU immigrants and EU immigrants. Why single out the least important contributing factor that is dwarfed by the impact of Britons themselves? Leaving the EU will change little in this respect, not least because EU migrants are attracted by work, are younger, are better educated and are more mobile, all of which tend to reduce fertility levels compared to the UK average.

Neither will Brexit affect well-established and long-standing local patterns of demand for the better performing schools. That is, unless Brexit is to be combined with forcing non-native Britons back to the other EU-27 countries. This is something which has been ruled out by everyone, even UKIP, since it would prompt a retaliatory reverse flow of almost as many Britons back to the UK. Apart from unleashing unpredictable forces in Europe (there are enough of those around at the moment) for very little gain, it would be one heck of a mess to sort out.

Blaming is easy, solving is not

So if Brexit is not the answer to the coming surge in school age children, as well as the high local demand for certain schools in particular locations, what would improve matters? There no prizes for guessing the answers:

  • The UK government (Department of Education and Chancellor of the Exchequer) should take its responsibility seriously and allocate the capital funding today in order to create the necessary new school places tomorrow and relieve localised pressure for school places.
  • Local government should ensure that public funds result in schools being built in the right locations, especially in high demand urban areas, while also ensuring fair access in demand hot spots so as to avoid accentuating social segregation.
  • Ms Priti Patel and the rest of the Brexiteers, not least Mr Michael Gove, should acquire a bit of humility and refrain from pinning their and their fellow British politicians’ own long-standing public policy failings (e.g. housing provision, NHS funding, capital funding for school, etc.) on the EU and scapegoating EU immigrants at the same time.

Now that would be a nice start in actually trying to solve at least one of Britain´s public policy challenges.

Will it happen? Fat chance.

It is much easier and politically rewarding to keep pointing the finger at EU immigrants. In the past, that finger was pointed at any old immigrant. These days, in the lead-up to the EU referendum, it is no coincidence that it is EU immigrants that are singled out.

And what happens after the 23rd of June 2016, when it has become normal and acceptable to blame Britain´s long-standing public policy ills (e.g. access to housing, access to education, access to health, benefits abuse, etc.) on foreigners, rather than the Britons who are responsible for policy-making, planning and funding? Will Britons wake-up and find that those public services have miraculously improved? Scapegoating is far too easy; trying to understand the problems and then solving them is much, much harder.

“It’s too easy to criticize a man when he’s out of favour, and to make him shoulder the blame for everybody else’s mistakes.” ― Leo Tolstoy, War and Peace

© Ricardo Pinto, 2016, AngloDeutsch™ Blog, www.AngloDeutsch.EU


Britain’s Productivity Puzzle and Brexit

Britain has a huge challenge. In the fractious lead-up to the Brexit referendum on the 23rd of June 2016, almost everything imaginable is being use for or against the European Union (EU), but on this occasion I am not referring to the EU challenge. I am alluding to the title of this post, namely the productivity of the UK, as this has direct implications for economic growth, wages and ultimately living standards. Given its importance, it should be the No 1 issue in the debate about the future of the UK, except that it is barely touched upon. This is a mistake.

The Theory

Productivity refers to how efficiently inputs (i.e. capital and labour) are used to produce outputs (i.e. goods and services), the best measure of productivity being output per hour. In theory productivity matters a good deal: Britain’s capacity to raise its standards of living over time depends almost entirely on its ability to increase its output per worker.

Productivity is also crucial in determining the long-term growth rates of the economy; stronger productivity growth leads directly to faster GDP growth. If this happens, tax revenues increase and budget deficits decrease. Governments have more to spend on public services such as health, housing, school places, GP / hospital capacity, infrastructure, etc. all of which are at the centre of the Brexit discussion. Naturally, the reverse also holds true: with lower productivity. And if Britain’s productivity is lower than its competitors, such as other EU nations, its relative standard of living decreases over time.

Productivity matters a great deal. The Nobel Prize winning economist Paul Krugman is reported to have said that: “Productivity isn’t everything, but it’s nearly everything”. What is the situation in Britain?

Productivity Puzzle

British labour productivity has traditionally grown at around 2% per year since the 1970s. That is not at all bad but the point is that since the global recession began in 2007, Britain´s productivity stagnated and continues to do so almost a decade later. Official reports stress that: “… such a prolonged period of essentially flat productivity is unprecedented in the post-war era”. The Chart below illustrates the trend.

Chart UK Productivity and GDP

Although economic growth has resumed quite strongly since 2013, this is mainly the result of an increase in the total number of hours worked in the UK, rather than rising productivity. What this means is that Britons are working harder to produce the same amount of goods and services than was the case prior to 2007, and much harder than if productivity growth had continued at its 2% annual trend rate. The feeble productivity level leads directly to the stagnation in UK wages and living standards. This is already having significant effects in terms of the on-going package of austerity in Britain, which is being felt across the whole country and is, if anything intensifying. People´s economic pain is much more a consequence of low productivity than of the costs of the EU or the freedom of movement of people (EU immigration).

If Britain’s productivity does not bounce up to the 2% trend, the implications for the economy, public finances and future living standards will be even more severe than is already the case.

International comparisons illustrate just why this is the No. 1 challenge.

Chart International Productivity Comparison

Based on real GDP per hour worked in 2014, the UK was ranked sixth among the Group of Seven (G7) countries, with Germany top and Japan bottom (the Chart below illustrates the issue). UK productivity was 18 percentage points below the average of the other G7 countries, the widest productivity gap since at least 1991. To illustrate the point further, it was 10 percentage points lower than Italy (which is hard for Britons to swallow), 30 percentage points lower than Italy and 36 percentage points lower than Germany. On the basis of output per worker, UK productivity was 19 percentage points below the average for the rest of the G7 in 2014.

The resumed economic growth and low unemployment rate combined with stagnant productivity has led people to talk of the UK’s “productivity puzzle”, as Britain loses ground to its major competitors.

Pumping-up Productivity: Brexit implications

Unlike Eurozone economies, Britain has its own currency and is fully in charge of its monetary policy. Blaming the EU and European immigrants for all its ills is far too easy and convenient. Instead, Britons should take a good, hard look at their own economy and what is required in order to increase productivity not just back to 2%, but ideally above this threshold.

What kinds of solutions are available to Britain in order for it to rise to the productivity challenge? The good news is that there is broad agreement about the main policy options. The bad news is that none of them are quick fixes and most of them will almost certainly not be improved by leaving the EU. The possible solutions include the following:

  • Raise the skills and qualifications of the labour force: the education system has to produce a better educated labour force and employers need to invest more in skills via training, apprenticeships, etc. These are known to increase labour productivity, however, the evidence is that this is not happening sufficiently. This may be part of the reason why Britain has been attracting ready-made, educated and trained migrants from the EU and non-EU countries (academia, R&D, industry, health service, financial sector, etc.). It is doubtful that the UK can immediately raise skills and qualifications to substitute what comes through the EU (the EU labour force is more highly educated in terms of average levels of human capital), thus productivity levels are unlikely to be enhanced by Brexit in the short to medium term. It takes time, investment and planning to systematically build-up the human capital base.
  • Increase investment in technology: the adoption of new technology is a key factor in improving productivity, as illustrated by the advent of computers and the internet in the recent past. A strong focus on generation of innovative products, services and processes would translate into high productivity levels. However, exiting the EU may either slow down this process or increase the investment cost. This is not just because of the potential loss of international collaborative innovation and R&D networks across European countries, which the EU funds. Brexit would also result in uncertainty about trade in the short-term and almost certainly less favourable trade agreements with the remaining EU trade block of 27 countries. This is likely to translate into increased import and export costs for Britain, including of equipment and technology. By opting out of the EU and its 50+ trade agreements, less favourable trade agreements will eventually be negotiated with 120+ countries. If investment in technology becomes more costly, firms may delay or avoid it, so it is unclear if the UK’s productivity levels will be enhanced by Brexit.
  • Increase substitution of capital for labour: if labour becomes cheaper and more freely available, firms may have fewer incentives to invest and may choose to use labour intensive methods, rather than capital-intensive ones. This would result in lower levels of productivity, though jobs and incomes would be maintained, at least for a certain period of time. A surge in productivity would require a reverse in the trend of underinvestment in plant and machinery, as well as physical infrastructure. If Brexit means much less availability and/or more expensive skilled capital, this could spur greater levels of substitution of capital for labour, thus stimulating productivity. At the same time, this might have implications for employment.
  • Improve the morale of workers: during recessions or periods of industrial unrest and low worker morale, productivity tends to fall. By contrast, if workers are motivated and happy, productivity is likely to be higher. The morale of employees can be affected by numerous variables, including but not only wages, bonuses and other monetary incentives. It is also affected by issues such as state of industrial relations, sense of having a stake in the company and enjoyment of the job. These are specific to each nation and enterprise. But to the extent that morale is affected by other factors such as nature of the labour contracts, hours worked, leave of various sorts, etc. Brexit is unlikely to affect morale positively, since many of those factors are influenced by EU rules and regulations (see below) affecting all 28 countries.
  • Minimise rules and regulations: regulations should not impose excessive costs on enterprises and a balance has to be struck between say being able to get rid of poor or disruptive employees and having lax labour market regulations which exploit employees and results in high turnover and demotivation. EU regulations affect health and safety standards, discrimination at work, hours worked, paternity/maternity periods, minimum breaks, minimum paid holiday periods, etc. Brexit might well be good for British employers if regulations are scrapped and labour market flexibility is increased, but would almost certainly come at the expense of employees. Many other regulations are the solely the purview of the British government. Britain has already spawned zero hour contracts which maximise employer flexibility over almost a million employees. It widely acknowledged that Britain already has one of the most deregulated business environments around – some have argued that there is excessive deregulation, for example in the financial sector. Further deregulation would be possible upon Brexit, but it is questionable whether this would necessarily be desirable. It might undermine labour gains, for example, if rules and regulations concerning discrimination, maximum work hours, health and safety, etc. are undermined. These would reduce job security, employer costs and possibly spur productivity, but much would come at the expense of employees.
  • Maximise capacity utilisation: during economic booms, firms tend to squeeze more output out of existing capacity by encouraging people to work overtime, thus increasing labour productivity. In recessions, they may hold on to workers, rather than releasing them even if they are working below capacity, resulting in labour productivity falls. There is some evidence of “labour hoarding” (firms cutting output but keeping labour in reserve for the recovery), which is part of the reason for the productivity puzzle previously discussed. It seems unlikely that leaving the EU will increase capacity utilisation. Britain´s trade balance is already poor, it exports 44% of its goods and services to the EU and Brexit would mean negotiating new, less favourable terms with the other 27 countries of the EU and 120+ countries that the EU has trade agreements with. Rather than maximising capacity utilisation, it is likely that the reverse will happen upon Brexit (less favourable trade agreements, more risk, higher costs, etc.), with negative implications for employment, wages and tax revenue.

The above does not represent a complete list of possible solutions to the British productivity puzzle. Other factors could be considered, such as seeking to rebalance the economy away from services (about 75% of GDP) towards manufacturing (about 10% of GDP).

In 2015, the Government published its productivity plan (Fixing the foundations: Creating a more prosperous nation), covering issues such as improve transport and digital infrastructure, increase investment, enhance workforce skills, build more houses, move people off welfare and into work, encourage exports, rebalance economy away from London, etc. The 15 point plan is illustrated in the Chart below.

Chart 15 Point Productivity Plan

The productivity plan seems worthwhile implementing but none of it is a quick fix to Britain´s fundamental problem and, on balance, Brexit would not unleash an immediate gain in productivity.

To conclude, the cause of austerity, low productivity and stagnating wages in the UK are first and foremost to do with the UK, not the EU or Europe more generally. The number one priority for the country is to raise the productivity levels, regardless of whether Britain remains in the EU or not. If this happens, the wages, the public expenditure and the standards of living take care of themselves. But it is hard to see just how the UK’s productivity puzzle could be eased by Brexit.

© Ricardo Pinto, 2016, AngloDeutsch™ Blog, www.AngloDeutsch.EU


The Big Brexit Risk? It’s the trade, stupid!

When I have discussions with my fellow Britons about the Britain, the European Union (EU) and Brexit, sooner or later, I hear a complaint that runs along the following lines:

“We thought we were joining for trade reasons, but it has evolved into something completely different. We did not agree to that.”

The implication of course is that in making the decision to join in the mid-1970s, the British public had somehow misled about the true nature of what was then the European Economic Community (EEC) and is now the European Union (EU). There is also a strong sense that the main reason for joining, trade and commerce, has become less important over time.

The simple answer is that all institutions, the EU included, must evolve or become irrelevant. This applies to NATO, the UN and this certainly applies to the EU. Still, there is a sense of Britons having being “sold a pig in a poke”. That somehow they got into something without knowing its true nature. This sense of Britons having got in bed with an EEC trading relationship in 1973 and waking up in 2016 with the EU, with all its imperfections, is important to the outcome of the EU referendum to be held in Britain on the 23 June 2016.

Therefore, this post delves into history to examine the debates that were held in Britain in the mid-1970s and to unpack whether joining the EU was just about trade. It also addresses the extent to which trade remains important to any decision about whether to remain in the EU or not.

Brexit Referendums I and II

To put it bluntly, the UK joined the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1973 without the British voter being asked. The Labour Party’s general election manifesto of October 1974 committed Labour to allow Britons the opportunity to decide whether Britain should remain in the Common Market on renegotiated terms or leave it entirely. In 1975, the first referendum covering the whole of Britain was held. One could say that 2 years after joining the EEC, the first Brexit referendum took place. The result was clear-cut: 67% of voters supported the campaign to stay in the EEC.

If the clear result was meant to put an end the debate about Britain in the EU, it failed. On 23 June 2016, we shall have the second Brexit debate, 43 years after joining the EEC. You can be sure that it will still not end the debate either, regardless of which way the vote goes.

A reading of what took place then shows that commerce/trade was a focus of the debate on the pros and cons of remaining in the EEC or, put another way, an evident desire to ensure that Britain´s relative economic decline compared with its EEC neighbours was put to an end. It is not unusual for a particular topic to predominate in elections and referendums. But it would not be correct to suggest that commerce/trade was the only topic of discussion at the time or indeed that the political nature of the EU project was not clear to Britons at the time. Labour figures of the day, such as Simon Jenkins, Michael Foot and Barbara Castle, as well as Enoch Powell on the Conservative side engaged in a debate about the possible effects on British sovereignty, among other issues. The deep fissures that were created in the Conservative Party (and to some degree the Labour Party) were not the result of a simply a debate on the commercial/trade pros and cons of Brexit. At the core of the heated difference of opinion was a possible loss of sovereignty and Britain´s place in the world, be it at the side of our European neighbours or facing towards the Anglophone / Commonwealth world. Today, there is an equally fractious debate where immigration is the leitmotif, connected with a discourse about health tourism, benefit tourism, access to housing, trade prospects and loss of sovereignty to Brussels.

The polling in the mid-1970s illustrated voters’ wider concerns, including defence, Britain’s voice, avoiding future wars, etc., though trade/commerce/economy was undoubtedly a major issue. By then, Britain had lost the empire and replaced it with the Commonwealth. The “special relationship” with the USA was stronger, not least because the Cold War was still raging. The Anglosphere relations in general (USA, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, etc.) was in much better shape than today.

And yet, in 1973 the British Government under the Conservative Party still decided that it was in UK’s best interests to join the EEC after a decade of persistently trying to join the club and being vetoed by the French under Charles de Gaulle on two separate occasions. This was no spur of the moment decision on the part of the British government, but a clear recognition that it was in the country’s long term interest to do so. On 5 June 1975, a clear majority (over 67% of voters) reinforced the situation by voting to remain in the EEC, rather than going it alone again.

Those decisions were made at a time when Britain was much more dominant in global trade, prior to the rise of China and India, and before the dawn of full on globalisation. If it was the right decision then, there is no obvious reason for presuming that Britain would be better off on its own today, when the world is so much more interconnected. This is especially so because regional trade aggregations are increasingly common so as to maximise negotiation power, rather than bilateral arrangements. Examples of such regional trade blocs, apart from the EU itself, include the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), perhaps soon the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), etc.

I do not subscribe to the view that a future outside the EU will be bleak for Britain. This argument is overdone by the Remain campaign and backfires because Britons do not believe it and resent those seeing to make use of the fear factor to “bounce” them into voting accordingly. Britain has an amazing economy, with dense infrastructure and packed with exceptional human capital. This is a fantastic foundation for future competitiveness. Britain is and will remain a key international economy and will continue to be a wealthy nation with quality of life and standards of living for the foreseeable future, regardless of the Brexit outcome.

So the real issue is: will Brexit help or hinder Britain´s future prosperity, since trade will play a key role in its future development.

EU and UK after Brexit: lose — lose

The EU area is the largest trade block by a considerable margin. Although trade patterns do shift over time, the simple fact is that the EU is by far the UK´s largest market: around 44% of exports went to the EU in 2014. British firms sold around £500 billion worth of goods and services to foreign buyers, according to the Office for National Statistics, and almost half (£230 billion) of those earnings came from the EU. The EU´s dominant role in the UK trade position is hardly surprising: our 27 EU trading partners are geographically close, there are no tariffs, close proximity means low transportation cost, etc. To reinforce the point, exports to the faster growing BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) accounted for only 10% of exports in 2014 according to Full Fact.

Furthermore, Britain´s trade balance is directly connected with the 50 trade agreements which the EU has signed with approximately 120 countries around the world. It is hard to foresee exactly what will happen immediately upon Brexit. What is clear for starters though is that Britain will have to negotiate a new trade deal with the 27 countries of the EU. It is wishful thinking to imagine that the EU will be willing to agree a trade agreement with the UK on a comparable basis to what pertains now. Furthermore, a trade agreement similar to the one that applies to the European Economic Area (EEA) is also extremely unlikely, since this would require Britain to accept the EU’s freedom of movement of people, paying into the EU budget and other concessions which would be impossible to justify. Such concessions would cause the British public (and everyone else) to question why they were asked to vote for Brexit in the first place.

Whatever trade agreement is reached with the EU, you can be certain that it will not be as advantageous to Britain as the above two scenarios (EU or EEA). It is also certain that the trade negotiations will take years to reach a conclusion — they always do. Moreover, it is unavoidable that the costs of export will increase for British firms. Several years to negotiation means uncertainty which in turn increases risk and thus raises the costs for British firms. This third scenario cannot possibly be an advantage to the British economy and the same applies to the remainder of the EU: Brexit will be a “lose — lose” scenario. Both the EU and Britain itself will lose in the short-term. The medium to long-term effect could go either way, including a continuation of the “lose — lose” scenario. This cannot possibly be good for the UK’s economy. After all, the Britain´s trade balance has been in deficit more or less permanently since 1990. This will only make things worse since the EU accounts for 44% of the current exports.

The Anglophone Zone: hopes dashed

The Brexiteers are well aware that in the short-term both Britain and the EU will lose out. This is precisely the reason why they have emphasised that it is in the EU´s own interest to negotiate a good deal with Britain. Perhaps, but I would not hold my breath on that account. What sounds too good to be true, usually is. There will be a price to pay for Britain undermining the “European project”. There is such a thing as vindictiveness in human nature and the leaders of the EU nation states are only too human.

Whatever they may say in public, the Brexiteers are also aware of this, which is why their pin their main hopes and expectations on other countries, not least the key Anglophone ones, to step into the breech and sign-up bilateral trade agreements with Britain.

So it came as a bitter blow to them when Barack Obama came to the UK and highlighted a few points, including:

  • The priority for the USA is the EU as it covers 28 countries and 500+ million people;
  • Britain will need to go to the “back of the queue” for a trade agreement;
  • It will take years for a trade agreement to be negotiated with Britain;
  • Being part of the EU does not moderate British influence in the world, it magnifies it.

With this, the Brexiteer Emperors (Boris Johnston, Michael Gove, Iain Duncan Smith, Nigel Farage, etc.) were left without any trade clothes. They went ballistic in their attempts to discredit the President´s statement of fact, for that is exactly what it is. Any country would prioritize trade negotiation with the largest trade block in the world over a nation of 65 million people. The Brexiteers´ fragile trade hopes were dashed and predictably there was an unprecedented outpouring of vitriol, verging on racism, against the outgoing President of the USA, the country that Britain stresses it has a long-standing “special relationship” with. But obviously this does not extend to trade matters.

Should Brexit occur in June 2016, Britain would need to negotiate some or all of the EU´s 50 trade agreements with 120 countries, not counting the EU and EEA countries, if it expects to continue trading with them on a similar basis to today. Since it is impossible to negotiate all of those trade agreements in parallel, it will take decades to go through the trade negotiations just to end-up with the same situation as is currently the case within the EU. The UK does not have a Department of Trade but you rest assured that not only will one be created immediately upon Brexit, since the current trade competences lie with the EU. The institutional needs would arise in other areas where the EU currently has competences. The future Department of Trade will be large, it will be costly and it will be under tremendous pressure to get bilateral trade agreements done, and sharpish. When pressure exists to get things done quickly, bad deals are struck. Ask any salesman.

There is no evidence that either the Anglosphere (USA, India, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, South Africa, etc.) or other major countries such as China, Japan, Brazil, etc. will be willing to negotiate trade deals with Britain as quickly or as favourably as with the EU: the size and potential EU market is so much larger. Britain only constitutes 13% of the EU´s population but will be under pressure from enterprises to negotiate the new trade deals, pronto. Consequently, there is absolutely no reason for the future bilateral trade agreements to be as generous to the UK as to the regional block of EU countries.

If we accept the assumption that delays, uncertainty and risk add to the costs to doing business, then British exporting firms will experience higher costs for the years and/or decades that the negotiation process will last in replacing the existing EU trade agreements. The firms´ higher cost base will affect the level of British exports, probably negatively, though the magnitude and duration are not possible to predict without economic modelling.

The likely post-Brexit trade scenario does not look rosy for Britain… but the bad news is that it is probably the best case scenario.

A worse scenario is that the EU will not rush and/or wish to punish the UK for Brexit. The worst case scenario though is that, in addition, some of the 120+ countries covered by the EU agreements that Britain is currently part of, may close their markets to British enterprises until bilateral trade agreements are negotiated and signed. If this were to happen to any extent, British firms will automatically lose market share. In this scenario, British exporting enterprises would almost certainly suffer a major contraction until they are able to replace the (hopefully) temporarily lost markets.

It does not take genius to work out the possible consequences for British firms and thus for the British economy, in terms of the loss in competitiveness, export, employment, wages, tax revenue, public expenditure, etc. There are other interpretations though, such as by those bankrolling the Brexit campaign. Peter Hargreaves has acknowledged the insecurity that would result from Brexit and stressed that “It would be the biggest stimulus to get our butts in gear that we have ever had”“We will get out there and we will be become incredibly successful because we will be insecure again. And insecurity is fantastic.” Maybe so for a billionaire stockbroker but I am doubtful that the average Briton will see perceive insecurity in quite the same manner.

Is the Brexit trade risk worth it?

The above analysis is not based on economic modelling or other statistical analysis: it is based on the application of logic to the likely consequences of British exit from the EU and thus no longer being part of the Single Market. Voters must make a decision about whether the risk of Brexit is worth it. The facts relating to trade are not complex, even if the exact process, duration and impacts are:

  • Brexit means Britain turning its back on (in the sense of no longer being part of) the largest single trading block in the world in terms of population (500 million) and/or purchasing power;
  • British withdrawal from the EU means no longer being part of the 50+ trade agreements with 120+ countries;
  • EU countries are extremely unlikely to react immediately and offer Britain the same trade terms as the current one, which means uncertainly, risk and greater cost for British enterprises, rendering them, all other things being equal, less competitive in terms of export;
  • Britain will also have to negotiate new trade deals with non-EU countries, all of which will take years or probably decades to achieve;
  • Britain already has advantageous trade relations with the Commonwealth countries dating back to 1949, so cannot expect to greatly expand in its traditional markets;
  • The Anglosphere will not necessarily offer the UK preferential treatment. The USA has stated that Britain will “go to the back of the queue” in trade negotiations. None of the other Anglophone or any other countries has offered Britain accelerated trade agreements for the simple reason that they are complex and take a long time to negotiate to mutual satisfaction;
  • Even if the UK goes through a process of negotiating the current 50+ trade agreements with 120+ countries on its own (it lacks people and skills since it has relied on the EU to perform this role for decades), it will take years or decades to achieve and a nation of 65 million cannot negotiate trade agreements on a comparable let alone more advantageous basis than the EU;
  • Whether the Brexiteers care to admit it or not, Brexit will not be good for Britain´s trade in the short term. It will be bad for the EU too but it is not as reliant on the UK market as the UK is dependent on its market (44%of exports in 2014). On the other hand, Brexit could have catastrophic economic consequences if key countries refuse to make their markets accessible during the period until bilateral trade agreements are signed, which could last quite a while.

Is Brexit a risk worth taking in terms of the possible consequences for trade, export and potentially unemployment and wages? To paraphrase the well/known USA electoral saying, “It´s still the trade, stupid!”

© Ricardo Pinto, 2016, AngloDeutsch™ Blog, www.AngloDeutsch.EU


Is British Sovereignty undermined by the EU?

The single most important criticism made by the Vote Leave campaign in the current European Union (EU) referendum is that Britons should vote for their politicians who in turn should decide their own laws, rather than politicians from other nations. This boils down to a matter of British sovereignty and whether the UK is being drawn into accepting legislation that is emanating from the European Commission (EC) and European Parliament (EP), rather than from the British Parliament. If Britain has become a “captive” state and EU-imposed competences are out of kilter with those of the nation state, in this case the House of Commons and House of Lords, then democracy is undermined. 

If this simple but powerful argument is correct, then I too would be fearful of the overweening power of “Europe” as opposed to those who are elected by us to represent us. So it is worthwhile examining the potential loss of sovereignty in more detail.

In, Out…

The UK to keep out of what has now become the EU from the point when it was established in 1952 (European Coal and Steel Community). Its membership was then vetoed by the French (1963 and 1967) until 1973 when Britain joined the European Economic Community (EEC). It took over a decade of determination on the part of the UK to join the EU. Britain did not join on a whim but on the basis of a hard-nosed calculation of the balance of benefits that the UK would gain from joining. In 1975, a majority (67%) of British voters chose to remain in the EU, following a hard-fought first EU Brexit referendum. Britain joined and chose the remain in the EU fully cognisant that as a result it would be voluntarily and willingly pooling some aspects of UK national sovereignty with what was then the EEC. This was nothing new or unusual: all nations do this to some degree where they see the benefits of doing something which is cannot be achieved on their own. Classic examples, apart from joining the EU, are the United Nations (UN), the World Trade Organisation (WTO), North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), etc. These agreements amplify the UK’s power and influence at the global level.

UK vs EU sovereignty

There is a pervasive viewpoint in Britain that it thought it was joining a trade agreement, rather than a political one. All commentators agree that the EU has always been first and foremost about avoiding future wars in Europe, something which the EU has done very successfully.  So much so that it, rightly, received the Nobel Peace Prize in 2012 for six decades of advancement of peace, reconciliation, democracy and human rights in Europe. There is no diagreement about the fact that it was always a political project which went beyond trade, indeed trade was not even a reason for the EU receiving the prize. If the politicians in the mid-1970s chose to highlight the trade angle to the nation during the lead-up to the EU Referendum, it was their choice (just as immigration is the topic of choice this time around). But this underestimates the broad and intense nature of the debate that took place in the mid-1970s. It was never just about trade so Britons were not sold a pig in a poke by their own politicians.

Also, it is frequently claimed that too much of the legislation comes from the EU. No one has been able to pin this down precisely but estimates vary from 7-70%. The  House of Commons Library has undertaken a comprehensive analysis how the extent of ‘EU influence’ in UK laws and concluded that: “it is possible to justify any measure between 15% and 50% or thereabouts”, depending on the approach. It noted that 15-17% of UK law is derived from EU membership, but about 50% of UK legislation with “significant economic impact” originates from the EU. It is up to each one to decide what is too much. But perhaps it is more enlightening not just to ask how much originates from the EU but to assess the degree to which such law is useful or not (see the Balance of Competences review below).

Another point to note is that all the EU directives, regulations, treaties, etc, take years to develop, which allow all nation states, Members of European Parliament and stakeholders to engage with the process of developing new laws and regulations within the competence of the EU. Each national parliament decides whether to accept or not and in recent times, national referendums have scuppered draft EU Treaties. The days of a “single speed” EU are long gone and nation states can opt out if they so desire and Britain regularly chooses this option. 

In joining the 8 other countries, now 28 following further enlargement, the UK is closely involved in the process of making the EU legislation. It is not simply a matter of fighting for the national interest, something which Britain as one of the big beasts of the EU is able to do. Compromise was and remains the name of the EU game. However, whenever push comes to shove and Britain bangs on the EU desk, it has got what it wants. This includes Margaret Thatcher’s rebate, the various opt outs such as from Schengen and now the EU special accommodation of Britain’s needs in advance of the EU referendum on the 23 June 2016 (see below).

It may have chosen to pool its sovereignty in the mid-1970s but the fact is that Britain can opt out of the EU at any point of its own choosing. The British government does not even need to hold a national referendum to leave. If the British government decided upon Brexit tomorrow, it could exit the EU simply by dissolving the European Communities Act of 1972. Permission would not be required from either voters or the EU.

On the basis of the preceding points, it is evident that the UK is a sovereign country that chooses to engage with the EU, that it can opt out of EU treaties and other legal instruments that it does not agreed with and that it can regain control of all the elements of its sovereignty that it currently chooses to pool authority with the EU in order to achieve goals that it would otherwise not be able to do on its own. This is the very essence of sovereignty.

… Shake it all about (or the Balance of Competences Review)

If Britain remains a sovereign country and is able to abolish the European Communities Act whenever it likes, which is after all the whole point of the forthcoming EU Referendum, what are the competences that it has chosen to pool with the EU and do these make sense?

At the end of the day, what really matters is not whether laws and regulations originate from the House of Commons or the EU but whether such laws contribute to our economic, social and environmental well-being or not. The public concern about a potential or actual loss of national sovereignty compared with a gain of “unelected” and “Eurocratic” powers is what led directly to the Review of the Balance of Competences between the UK and the EU which was initiated by the UK government in 2012 and completed in 2014.

The Treaty of Lisbon (2009) sets out the exact competences or the areas where Treaties give the EU competence to act, including giving EU institutions the power to legislate, to adopt non-legislative acts or to take any other action. The type of competences vary:

  • EU has exclusive competence: only the EU can act such as customs, competition, international agreements, etc.
  • Competences are shared between the EU and the member states: the member states can act only if the EU has chosen not to such as consumer protection, environment, transport, etc.
  • EU has competence to support, coordinate or supplement the actions of the member states: EU may not adopt legally binding acts that require the member states to harmonise their laws and regulations such as health, economy, employment, social policy, etc.

The UK government undertook an official review of a whole raft of EU competences, including the following 32 documents:

Report title Lead department / ministry
1 Single Market: Free Movement of Goods HM Revenue and Customs
2 Taxation HM Treasury
3 Animal Health and Welfare and Food Safety Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
4 Health Department of Health
5 Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid Department for International Development
6 Foreign Policy Foreign and Commonwealth Office
7 Single Market: Free Movement of Goods HM Revenue and Customs
8 Asylum and Non-EU Migration Home Office
9 Trade and Investment Department for Business Innovation and Skills
10 Environment and Climate Change Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
11 Transport Department for Transport
12 Research and Development Department for Business Innovation and Skills
13 Culture, Tourism and Sport Department for Culture, Media and Sport
14 Civil Judicial Cooperation Ministry of Justice
15 Single Market: Free Movement of Persons Home Office
16 Single Market: Free Movement of Services Department for Business, Innovation and Skills
17 Single Market: Financial Services and the Free Movement of Capital HM Treasury
18 EU Budget HM Treasury
19 Cohesion Department for Business, Innovation and Skills
20 Social And Employment Department for Business, Innovation and Skills
21 Agriculture Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
22 Fisheries Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
23 Competition and Consumer Policy Department for Business, Innovation and Skills
24 Energy Department of Energy and Climate Change
25 Fundamental Rights Ministry of Justice
26 Economic and Monetary Policy HM Treasury
27 Police and Criminal Justice Home Office, Ministry of Justice
28 Information Rights Ministry of Justice
29 Education, vocational training and youth Department for Education
30 Enlargement Foreign and Commonwealth Office
31 Voting, Consular and Statistics Cabinet Office, FCO, National Statistician’s Office
32 Subsidiarity and Proportionality Foreign and Commonwealth Office

The House of Lords, in its assessment of the review of competences, stated that: “The Review was an ambitious, indeed unprecedented, exercise. The production of the reports, broadly within the projected timetable, was a considerable achievement. We believe that, for the most part, the individual reports within the Review give a fair and neutral assessment of the balance of competences between the EU and the UK.” The House of Lords did express disappointment that: “… no consideration was given to the Justice and Home Affairs measures subject to the block opt-out decision” and the “… lack of balance in the Single Market: Free Movement of Persons, Animal Health and Welfare and Food Safety and Fisheries reports” as well as the lack of “… a final report that could reflect upon cross-cutting areas, such as inter-institutional agreements and flexible integration.

These are quibbles with what was a thorough, transparent and comprehensive process carried out by the British public authorities, experts and stakeholders. No one questions the overall conclusion of the balance of completeness review, which is that there is nothing fundamentally wrong with the balance of EU competences in the UK. Had this not been the case, you can be sure that the Leave Campaign would be using this treasure trove of information. 

What was prioritised by the UK for EU reform?

Now that the Government, the civil service and a multiplicity of stakeholders across all 32 reviews have had their say and overwhelmingly agreed that the balance of competences is broadly appropriate, what did the Government chosen to push for reform in the EU?

After a drawn-out period of public posturing, the British government set-out the government’s basis for renegotiating the terms of the UK’s membership ahead of the EU referendum in a letter to Donald Tusk in November 2015. The UK’s demands focused on four issues:

  • Eurozone: explicit recognition that the euro is not the only currency of the EU to ensure countries outside the Eurozone are not disadvantaged, including ensuring that deeper financial union cannot be imposed on non-Eurozone members and that they also UK do not have to contribute to future Eurozone bailouts;
  • Competitiveness: a target for reduction of excessive regulation and extension of the single market;
  • Immigration: restriction of access to in-work and out-of-work benefits to EU migrants until they have been resident for four years or an “emergency brake” to stop the payments for four years is being discussed as a compromise;
  • Sovereignty: allow the UK to opt out from the EU’s ambition to forge an “ever closer union” of the peoples of Europe so it will not be drawn into further political integration and giving national parliaments greater power to block EU legislation.

What has Britain got from the EU?

The EU has generally played ball with the UK’s requests – nothing would be worse to the EU than losing one of its key members, especially when the refugee and Eurozone crises continue to rumble on. The outcome is the following:

  • Emergency break: a four-year freeze on in-work benefits for EU citizens working in the UK but this will only apply for new EU migrants for a period of 7 years. Thereafter the emergency break cannot be extended;
  • Child benefit: instead of stopping all child benefit payments going to children living outside the UK, whose parents are working in the UK, child benefit will be indexed to the cost of living for children living outside the UK to new arrivals to the UK and to all workers from 2020;
  • Eurozone vs rest: the top item was safeguards to protect countries outside the eurozone against regulation made by those inside. The UK got its wish: any non-Euro country will be able to force a debate among EU leaders about ‘problem’ eurozone laws. No country has a veto but can discuss, amend or delay Eurozone laws.
  • Ever-closer union: the UK wanted a declaration that this would not apply and got this: “It is recognised that the United Kingdom … is not committed to further political integration in the European Union … References to ever-closer union do not apply to the United Kingdom.”

Given that the EU involves 28 countries with diverse needs and priorities, the UK did not receive as bad a deal as many Britons and segments of the media maintain. Many EU member states were not exactly ecstatic about what they perceive as yet another example of Britain threatening to throw its referendum dolls out of the EU pram if  its national interests are not accepted. When push comes to shove, each nation must do what it has to, while still rubbing along with the others around the negotiation table.

British sovereignty: our way or the Highway?

The UK remains a sovereign state. It can withdraw from the EU at any point that Parliament chooses to. It does not need a referendum or approval from the EU. This is the essence of sovereignty and Britain (and all other 27 EU nation states) retains it. Britain is involved in all treaties, directives and regulations. It can influence them and it can choose to accept them or opt out of them, a right that it regularly exercises, as do other nations. 

An estimated 15-17% of UK laws originate from the EU and an estimated 50% of its important economic laws originated from the EU. But the issue is not what percentage originates from the EU, a process that Britain is closely involved in. The real issue is whether such legislation is valuable or not: perhaps this is a point recognised by the Vote Leave campaign, which is why they have been strangely quiet on this issue. 

The UK has gone through the most comprehensive assessment of the competencies of the EU ever conducted involving 32 detailed reviews, extensive consultations with British stakeholders, including civil servants, professionals and other experts. The conclusion was that the balance of competences between the UK and the EU (arising from the EU legislation) is appropriate.

On the basis of the evidence, the British  government has sought a new EU deal for Britain, prior to the referendum, focusing on: Eurozone, competitiveness, immigration and sovereignty and the EU has agreed to various changes. These do not amount to a fundamental change in the relationship with the EU but are a considered response to Britain´s self-defined priorities for reform. Whatever the EU agrees to must be acceptable for all 28 nations and it was never feasible to find a compromise that could satisfy the Brexiteers.

  • Is the EU sovereign over the UK Parliament: EU legislation affects 15-17% of UK law and up to 50% of economic legislation according to the estimates that have been made.
  • Is British sovereignty compromised by EU competences: Britain is a key part of the process of making laws and regulations in the EU. Britain has secured-opt outs from EU treaties, directives, etc. The British government chooses to pool British sovereignty with 27 other countries in order to achieve what it cannot do on its own such as legislation affecting the environment, countering terrorims and the common market.
  • Should I vote to leave the EU because of lack of sovereignty / balance of EU/UK competences: Britain can choose to leave the EU whenever it chooses to. There is not need to hold a referendum. It has the ultimate decision-making power. The unprecedented EU review concluded that there is nothing fundamentally wrong with the balance of EU competences in the UK. The EU has responded to the British priorities for EU reform. As one of 28 countries, Britain cannot always get everything that it wants. Compromise is the essence of the EU game.

© Ricardo Pinto, 2016, AngloDeutsch™ Blog, www.AngloDeutsch.EU


EU health tourism and the breakdown of the National Health Service (NHS)

In addition to other issues connected with the EU referendum (e.g. EU immigration, EU benefits tourism and housing crisis and the EU), Britain is currently hotly debating the crisis in the health system or the National Health Service (NHS). It is not unusual for segments of the British media to lead with headlines such as “Migrants are pushing NHS to breaking point,” claiming that the NHS has been left “on its knees” by “uncontrolled migration” from the EU which has merged with the theme of “health tourism” or the practice of travelling abroad in order to receive medical treatment.

Prominent members of the Leave EU campaign, such as Michael Howard and others in the Vote Leave campaign have said: “We will be talking a lot about the NHS in this campaign because we believe that a leave vote is vital if we are to protect the NHS for future generations.” Priti Patel, the Employment Minister, claims that the health service is under threat because of EU membership: “Current levels of migration are causing unsustainable pressures on our public services and we can see that the NHS is creaking under the strain.”

The implication is that EU migration / benefit tourism is at the root of the problems of the NHS. So this post addresses the nature of the UK health crisis and the extent to which it is attributable to the EU migration and health tourism.

Challenges every which way you look

The National Health Service (NHS) is the largest and oldest single-payer healthcare system in the world. It is primarily funded through the general taxation system that is overseen by the Department of Health. The NHS is built upon the principle of comprehensive health service provision based on clinical need, not ability to pay. The NHS provides healthcare to every legal resident of the UK, with most services free at the point of use.

When created after WW-II, the NHS was the pride and joy of the pioneering British welfare state and served as a model for many other countries. But the fact is that the NHS has been in crisis for decades going back to at least the 1980s. As Britons are well aware, wave upon wave of health reforms have sought to cure its ills yet the NHS remains as sick as ever. The starting point in the health debate is to acknowledge that the problems with the health system predate the influx of EU migrants to the UK which started in earnest in earnest 2004 and continues to this day. The NHS’ problems did not begin with EU immigrant and will not end if migration were suddenly to end, regardless of whether migrants originate from the EU (less than half of UK immigration) or elsewhere (Britons returning home, Commonwealth, students, etc. – more than half of the immigration).

The second point is to recognise that the challenges facing the NHS are many and varied, not least connected with an ageing population and the impact of modern diseases such as diabetes, obesity, cancer, etc., combined with escalating costs of procedures, medication and so on.

The health professionals are in the best position to assess the issues and whether those issues are connected with migration or not. In a recent publication “Challenges facing the NHS in England: a guide for MPs and Peers”, the NHS Confederation (representing over 500 NHS organisations that commission and provide health services, including hospitals, community and mental health providers, ambulance trusts and independent sector organisations providing NHS care) set out the main health challenges facing the health system. These are illustrated in the diagram below.

Chart 1 NHS Challenges

Neither immigration in general nor EU immigration specifically figures as a health challenge. There is no reference to NHS creaking / breaking / lack of sustainability due to migratory pressures. This is hardly surprising since all the evidence is that EU immigrants tending to be younger, better educated and in better health than the average Briton in the labour force. We tend to consume disproportionate amounts of health services as babies/children and as pensioners, especially after the age of 75. Young adults – the typical EU migrants – put relatively few pressures on the health system.

Rather, the Call for Action focuses on areas about which there is little controversy among the 500 health professionals in the NHS Confederation. They stress the need for stability if the NHS is to tackle its challenges (endless reforms); the need to increase staff (too few); the necessity for social care funding for people with long-term illnesses; the need to make mental health services available and accessible, etc. The most critical issue by far is the finance challenge; this is the underlying reason for the continuing problems faced by the NHS. The point to note is that the UK is exclusively responsible for the resources that it devotes (or not) to the NHS. No amount of finger-pointing in the general direction of the EU will alter this particular fact.

Furthermore, the NHS funding challenge is nothing new: it predates and supersedes other factors such as EU migration. This is the fundamental reason why the NHS has been gradually overtaken by other countries, as illustrated in comparative research among OECD countries highlighted in the Table below.

Chart 2 OECD health indicators 2015

Health Care Resources in OECD Countries (OECD, 2015)

The UK’s performance compared with OECD countries highlights the NHS’ fall from grace. The UK ranks:

  • 19th in terms of health expenditure per capita;
  • 24th in terms of doctors per capita;
  • 19th in terms of nurses per capita;
  • 26th in terms of hospital beds per capita;
  • 29th in terms of Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) units per capita;
  • 30th in terms of Computer Tomography (CT) scanners per capita.

Some countries, such as Germany, have even higher levels of EU immigration than the UK yet it comfortably outperform the UK in terms of the selected health indicators. Money, or rather the lack of it, is clearly an important reason for why the NHS is in the state that it is.

The UK’s austerity measures, which have been in place since 2009, included severe budget constraints with zero growth in health spending per person in real terms. On a per capita basis and as a share of GDP, health spending in the UK is slightly below the OECD average. Lack of financial capacity is clearly not the issue. Rather the UK government chooses to prioritize other public expenditure, such as defence, over the heath system. Furthermore, the situation is set to deteriorate: the NHS Confederation estimates that the gap between increasing demand for care and the funding available will be at least £30 billion by 2020. The key point is that other economies choose to put more resources into their health systems than Britain. The state of the NHS, by and large, reflects this particular policy prioritisation. Transferring the entire net budget that Britain spent in 2015 on the EU into the NHS, namely £8.5 billion (2014) would not make that much of a difference in the projected NHS deficit of £30 billion in 2020 for England alone. The Vote Leave campaign misleads in suggesting that cancelling one (EU contribution) will solve the problem of the other (NHS crisis).

EU health tourism: where’s the beef?

Health provision is clearly a national issue – the EU has no direct powers in this area except to support the common market. The Government’s audit of EU powers (the so-called balance of competence review) also covered health area and its official report concluded that: “…the UK Government believes that the current balance of competence is broadly appropriate.” It also noted that: “Industry were generally very supportive of the current position regarding competence.” It concluded that: “Evidence suggested that free movement of persons brings benefits for the UK health sector and for patients, but not without risk.”

There are “risks” perceived in some quarters, such as the EU’s Working Time Directive (WTD), which limits work to a maximum 48-hour week and lays down minimum requirements for rest periods and annual leave. But can critics really sustain the argument that the health profession should work longer hours than other professions? Most people would not agree. When it comes to a critical matter of life and death, most people would want a doctor / nurse / surgeon who is neither exhausted nor overworked (we all recall UK health workers, especially junior doctors, having to work absurd and dangerous numbers of hours in the past) when attending to their health needs. The WTD applies to all 28 countries and all professions; I see no reason for making an exception for the UK or for the NHS, though this does not preclude the possibility of fine-tuning the WTD.

There is also freedom of movement of doctors and nurses from across the EU working in the health system in the UK. This is actually a very good thing for the NHS, as acknowledged by the government’s official report: “In terms of health professionals, there has been a very positive impact for the NHS as 10% of NHS staff are from European Economic Area (EEA) countries, without whom there could be staff shortages.” For example, the Royal College of Midwives, has stressed that Britain would be hard-pressed to find enough midwives and nurses trained in the UK to replace the 33,000 from other EU countries who currently work in the NHS.

It is not only an issue of the damage that staff shortages might cause in such a sensitive area as the heath sector. The issue which those interested in improving the health system should be focusing on is exactly why Britain continues to be completely incapable of training a sufficient number of its own health professionals. I recall nurses and midwives being sourced from Ireland before the EU and the rest of the world became the NHS’s recruitment pool for health workers. No open-minded individual can fail to see Britain’s gain in this form of EU migration. If anything, other nations might well criticise the NHS’s beggar-thy-neighbour recruitment strategy (i.e. a policy by which one country attempts to remedy its economic problems by means that tend to worsen the economic problems of other countries) which basically mops-up experienced doctors, nurses, midwives, surgeons, etc. which other countries have paid to educate and train.

There is also the Cross Border Healthcare Directive which allows individuals to purchase health care and treatment from a provider in another Member State. This is supported by the health industry in the UK since it offers them the prospect of widening the sources of income by attracting EU patients and using excess capacity in the health system, for example in specialist areas such as diagnosis and treatment of rare diseases. Furthermore, under the current NHS arrangements, patients in one location of the UK are not free to seek treatment in another part where waiting times/lists may be shorter. However, the Cross Border Healthcare Directive enables them to seek treatment in other EU countries if they wish. This is a good thing: it allows patients to control their own health needs. Something that puts power in people’s hands over vast bureaucracies, for that is exactly what the NHS is, must be a good thing.

EU-related health costs: Britain only recovers 23% of what it could claim back

There is limited reliable data on the use of health services by immigrants and visitors, making robust estimates difficult. That said, the available evidence suggests that use of health services by immigrants and visitors appears to be lower than that of native Britons, as previously discussed, not least because immigrants and visitors are, on average, younger.

In 2014 an official report (Quantitative Assessment of Visitor and Migrant Use of the NHS in England), showed that EU (27 countries) and EEA (3 other countries) visitors and non-permanent residents cost the NHS an estimated £305 million, of which £220m is recoverable by England under the European Health Insurance Card (EHIC) scheme. Every EEA country issues EHIC cards to their citizens, thus enabling them to receive healthcare whilst on a temporary visit to another EEA country on the same basis that is provided to its own residents. People go on holiday in the EU/EEA knowing that if they fall ill or have an accident they will be able to access health care without the need for separate insurance. This saves time, effort and money for all and is widely considered a good thing.

Department of Health data for 2012-13 show that only about £50m was recovered from the EEA countries compared with the £173m that the England pays for British visitors to EEA countries. This means that the NHS / Department of Health are not claiming as much of the money that they are eligible to receive from the EEA countries as they could.

Some forget that this is not a one way street; it is not only EU nationals that come to the UK and use health service here. Britons also make a good deal of use of the health services in other EEA countries and the costs more or less balance out: £220m worth of health services received by EEA people in England, compared with £173m worth of services received by people from England in EEA countries.

The low percentage of recovery (22.7%) is due to one reason and oner reason only: NHS inefficiency, which is an issue for the UK to rectify. Why should Britain need over a decade to set-up a working reciprocal health cost management system when the other 27 nations have long ago managed to do so? It has been argued that there is a lack of knowledge among NHS healthcare professionals as to who is eligible for free treatment. Can this really be so fiendishly complicated as to systematically defeat the British health care system with its new generation of sharp suited, MBA educated management? Surely it is not like expecting the NHS to crack the health equivalent of the Enigma Code.

Rather than voting to Leave the EU for a problem that can only be pinned on Britain itself, it might be more effective to set-up a system to check if an individual is from the EEA and train healthcare professionals to recoup the costs of EU patients, as Britain is fully entitled (but fails systematically) to do.

EU-related health costs: instead of 0.18% of the NHS budget in England, it costs 0.26%

Interestingly but not surprisingly the actual health costs of EEA migrants are very low, despite all the emotive talk of “EU migrants / freedom of movement pushing NHS to breaking point” and “NHS is creaking under the strain of immigrants” emanating from the Vote Leave EU group such as Priti Patel and others. The annual NHS budget in England was worth £116 billion in 2015/6, so EEA migrants used-up 0.26% of the annual NHS budget (£305 million). When the costs that could have been recovered from EEA countries are taken into consideration (on the assumption that the NHS ever gets its act together), the percentage would drop to 0.18% (£220 million). There would appear to be vastly bigger fish to fry when it comes to saving costs in the British health system.

When this analysis is extended from England to the UK, the same health competences report noted that in 2012/13 the UK paid a net £805 million to EEA countries to cover the healthcare costs of Britons, especially pensioners, living in other countries. This sum illustrates just how many UK citizens benefit from the EU health provisions.

The health competences report also stressed that: “… many more UK pensioners choose to live in other EEA countries than pensioners from those EEA countries who live here. Using Spain as an example, approximately 400,000 British pensioners reside there at any one time. For a great majority of these, the fact that the UK covers their healthcare is of great benefit. It should also be noted that, had those citizens remained in this country, the UK would be meeting the costs of their NHS care in the usual way and in some Member States the average cost of healthcare can be lower.”

In other words not only do more British pensioners benefit from the system than EU pensioners gain from using the NHS but it would cost the NHS more to provide health care to those 400,000 Britons currently living in Spain (and potentially many others, since there were about 1.4 million Britons living in the EU) if they came back. The Vote Leave EU campaign would find it hard to swallow the point that EU health provisions may actually be saving British taxpayers money (and/or that the savings are being recycled for the benefit of the health of the people in Britain).

It should be noted that the NHS (Charges to Overseas Visitors) Regulations Act of 2015 requires hospitals to charge overseas visitors (not ordinarily resident) for the NHS services that they provide in a hospital or provided outside by staff employed by a hospital. GP services and services provided outside hospitals are not chargeable. So it would appear that Britain is well on the way to meeting the public concerns about the costs of health for visitors, whether from the EU or elsewhere.

EU health tourism: much ado about very little

The UK’s competences review concluded that, on balance, the EU’s engagement in the health sphere is appropriate and noted the major advantages of EU health directives, including the IHIC card, the number of EU educated nurses and doctors working in the UK and the capacity to access European level health services. There are real benefits for health institutions and citizens across EU countries.

In terms of the major health challenges facing the UK in the future, the 500 NHS Consortium health institutions did not identify immigrants as an issue: money or rather the lack of it is the key issue in Britain. The evidence is that EU/EEA citizens use the NHS intensively less than native Britons. In any case, Britons make extensive of health services in EEA countries, especially those that retire in Spain, France and elsewhere.

The EU introduced health transfer arrangements to ensure that each EEA nation pays according to the health services absorbed by their nationals. This is fair but it is up to each country to introduce the necessary systems and procedures. After a decade, the NHS is still unable of charge its share, which means that instead of EU nationals costing the NHS 0.18% of its annual budget, it actually costs 0.26% in England.

Boris Johnson, Michael Gove and other Vote Leave campaigners may insist that the “billions spent on the UK’s EU budget contribution to be spent on the NHS.” That is fair enough but let us not pretend that this will solve the problems in the health system at a stroke. Even if the GBP 8.5 billion net EU contribution were poured in its entirety into the NHS tomorrow, nothing would change fundamentally because the financial need is much greater than this contribution. Can it realistically be argued that EU migration / health tourism is pushing the NHS to breaking point, especially when large numbers of Britons and British pensioners living in the EU are actually reducing the costs to the NHS since the costs of health provision in Spain and elsewhere are lower than they would have been in the UK?

I don’t think this is such a bad health deal for Britain and is not a sufficient reason for voting to leave the EU in the forthcoming referendum.

  • Is the EU responsible for the state of British health system: the EU ensures that all EU citizens have access to health services in all countries at no extra cost or hassle.
  • Is the British government responsible for the state of British heath system: the UK is 100% responsible for national health provision and the health budget. The UK chooses to invest a smaller amount on health than other countries and this is the root cause of the health problems. Pumping Britain’s entire EU annual contribution in the NHS will not change the fundamentals of the health system, though it would certainly be helpful.
  • Should I vote to leave the EU because of EU health tourism: EU nationals make less use of the NHS than do native Britons. Also, there are more retired Britons living in EU countries and making use of other EU health systems than there are EU nationals living in the UK. Both save the NHS money and/or allow resources to be focused on health services in Britain.

© Ricardo Pinto, 2016, AngloDeutsch™ Blog, www.AngloDeutsch.EU


How extensive is EU benefit tourism in the UK anyway?

A cursory reading of Britain’s most popular newspapers might leave the distinct impression that immigrants, especially from the European Union (EU), are beating a path to the UK specifically in order to take-up welfare benefits, live in social housing, avail themselves of the health system and generally live the high life on the back of the hard-working citizens of the UK (i.e. benefit tourism) who actually pay taxes and thus subsidise the lives of such EU citizens.

 Immigration generally is “the” issue of the forthcoming EU referendum and if the above characterisation of the situation remotely reflects the truth, I would be campaigning to leave the EU too. Not surprisingly this is one of the key arguments of Eurosceptics and Brexiteers in the debate over the future of the UK in the EU. So this post examines the extent to which the EU freedom of movement of people contributes to benefit tourism in the UK. 

EU migrants sponging off Britons?

There are four fundamental freedoms in the EU which are designed to create a common market in Europe, namely to: sell goods, sell services, invest and work anywhere in the EU. Britons have no issues with the first three freedoms but remain deeply concerned about the fourth. 

The first point to note, as discussed in the previous post on EU immigration, is that the freedom of movement of people is not possible for seven years upon joining the EU, unless a nation chooses to opt-out as the UK did (together with Ireland and Sweden) in 2004. So, for example, the Croats will not be able to work in the UK until 2020 unless a country, such as Germany, decides otherwise. This is to ensure that there is not a rush out of a country that joins the EU. The second point to note is that out of the 508 million people in the EU, only 2.2% of them chose to live in another country of the EU. There is clearly no mass exodus of people from one EU country to another. The third point is that though the UK is indeed a very attractive country to move to, it by no means the only one or even the main one in the EU.

In terms of net migration (those arriving minus those leaving), the countries with the largest net inflows of foreign nationals were Germany (452,000), UK (267,000), Italy (235,000) and France (71,000) in 2013. The reality is that the more economically dynamic a country is, the more it is likely to attract people looking for work or to improve their lives.

Turning specifically to the issue of benefit tourism, the evident suggests that EU citizens come to the UK to study, work or to join their families, rather than because of the allure of the UK’s social benefits. This is illustrated in the graphic below, which shows that family reunion used to be the dominant entry route. Student inflows became the main reason for entry, but this has fallen significantly in recent years, something which is connected with the Conservative government’s drive to cap net migration at 100,000 per annum. Most immigration from the EU is for work-related reasons, whereas most immigration from outside the EU is for study-related reasons.

Figure 1: Annual Inflows of Migrants by Reason

Figure 1 Annual Inflow of Migrants by Reason

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Source: Immigration and the UK Labour Market, Jonathan Wadsworth, CEP, 2015

Furthermore, the same study shows that immigrants are better educated than their UK-born counterparts and that the educational gap is actually increasing over time over time. The “old” Europe or EU-15 migrants are twice as likely to be graduates and the “new” Europe or EU-8 migrants (the 8 Central and East European countries that joined the EU in 2004) are also more likely to be graduates than the UK-born, and most others have intermediate levels of education.

The conclusion of the research is unequivocal:

“There is still no evidence of an overall negative impact of immigration on jobs, wages, housing or the crowding out of public services. Any negative impacts on wages of less skilled groups are small. One of the largest impacts of immigration seems to be on public perception.” (2015, p.1).

But even if there is little or no evidence that EU immigrants to the UK reduce jobs and wages, housing or other public services (housing and health services are discussed in subsequent chapters), this cuts little ice with the Leave campaigners. They maintain the “benefit tourism” rhetoric in relation to EU migration, stressing that an unspecified proportion of EU migrants come to Britain specifically to take advantage of its generous welfare state.

To be fair, such belief is not unique to Britain. In Germany, similar pronouncements are regularly made by the CDU/CSU, the mainstream right of centre parties, as well as the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), a fast growing populist party. The AfD is the equivalent of UKIP. It wants to leave the Euro, rather than the EU, while also stopping benefit tourism and the flow of refugees to Germany. Both parties are aided and abetted by segments of the media in driving a general notion that EU benefit tourism is pervasive, unfair and must be stopped forthwith.

What exactly is the scale of EU benefit tourism?

A detailed report (ICF GHK and Milieu Ltd, 2013) concluded that non-active EU migrants represent a very small share (0.7% – 1.0%) of the total population in EU Member States. The evidence is that non-contributory benefit payments to immigrants account for between 1% – 5% of all benefits paid in France, Sweden, the Netherlands, etc. and above 5% in Belgium and Ireland. However, the share of non-active EU migrants is very small, both in the UK (1.2%) and in Germany (1.1%).

Other research examining recent EU immigrants to the UK of working age who are not students, not in employment and not in receipt of state benefit, estimates that this group amounted to 39,000 people received any benefit, including child benefit. To put this in perspective, this is only 1% of all recent EU nationals in the UK who are of working age, not students, not in employment but in receipt of some kind of state benefit. Since non-EU immigrants typically cannot access benefits until they have been resident in the UK for five years, it is unlikely that they would migrate with the intention of accessing state benefits.

The latest official government information (February 2015) reinforces the previously mentioned studies:

  • 371,220 working-age claimants of UK benefits (7.2% of total claimants) were non-UK nationals. Of these 113,960 were EU nationals, representing 30.7% of non-UK claimants and only 2.2% of all claimants;
  • In terms of the people who are out of work and claiming benefits, 287,300 were non-UK nationals claiming out-of-work benefits or 7.4% of total claimants. Of these 91,700 or 2.4% of total claimants were EU nationals;
  • People born outside the UK comprised 16.2% of the working-age population but only 7.7% of working-age individuals receiving key out-of-work benefits were non-UK nationals;
  • 19,579 families had Child Benefit awarded for 32,408 children living in EEA states, around two-thirds of whom were in Poland. 7,026 families had Child Tax Credit granted in respect of 11,762 children in EEA member states.

The Government’s own authoritative Balances of Competences review on the Single Market Free Movement of Persons (2014, paragraph 2.55) observed that:

“… none of the evidence we received was able to point to specific research or analysis on the importance of access to social security benefits in the decision to migrate.”

Whatever the Leave EU faction and segments of the media may claim, EU benefit tourism, to the extent that it exists, is much lower than the native population’s own use of such benefits. This reinforces the point that EU nationals come to the UK to work, not to sponge off Britons. Benefit tourism is not worth getting worked-up about, unless it is for cynical political reasons.

A storm in an English tea-cup

People generally emigrate due to the prospect of employment and better wages, rather because of the lure of welfare benefits. The EU migrant population is younger and better educated than the average Briton; the unemployment rate among EU migrants is also lower than that of the average Briton. When the figures for both non-EU and EU migrants are analysed, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the benefits tourism hysteria affects very people from the EU living in the UK. This is a storm in a tea-cup whipped-up by those that seek to pander to popular misconceptions rather than standing-up to them.

Benefit tourism, whether from the EU or elsewhere is largely a myth. It is not only that not many migrants are eligible to get benefits in the UK. It is that the great majority of EU migrants actually pay more than their share and take very little out in the form of benefits of any sort. EU migration is good for the tax man and for the welfare state in Britain.

  • Is the EU responsible for the level of benefit tourism in the UK: No. It only guarantees freedom of movement and equal treatment of all EU nationals.
  • Is the British government responsible for benefits eligibility in the UK: Yes. For UK and non-EU nationals; partly for EU nationals, but the recent renegotiation has resulted in a decision to tighten-up eligibility rules for EU nationals living in Britain.
  • Should I vote to leave the EU because of EU benefit tourism: No. The numbers of people involved are small and proportionately much lower than the native British population claiming benefits.

© Ricardo Pinto, 2016, AngloDeutsch™ Blog, www.AngloDeutsch.EU


Is EU immigation so negative for the UK and is it out of control?

EU immigration has been possibly the single most topical issue in Britain since 2004, when Britain allowed various new members of the European Union (EU) such as Poland to come and live and work in the UK. When the economic and financial crises hit, the views on immigration hardened noticeably in Britain, with an accent on immigration from central European countries. The discourse evolved into “British Jobs for British Workers” under the Labour Party. Under the Conservative Party, the debate intensified further, partly due to the impact of the UK Independence Party (UKIP), resulting in a “cap” on annual net immigration at 100,000 and concern over Britain’s “uncontrolled borders” due to the EU’s freedom of movement of people. Attention then shifted to Bulgarian and Romanian migrants and EU “benefit tourism.” Lately, the surge of refugees and asylum seekers to the EU in 2015, on-going tensions in the “jungle camp” in Calais and the possibility of jihadist terrorist sneaking through EU borders have elevated anxiety to peak levels.

This is a very potent mix of issues to discuss. In the context of the British referendum on whether to remain in the EU or not, the key issue boils down to this question: to what extent is the EU and its freedom of movement of people the reason for the current level of immigration in the UK and it is good or not for Britain??

Is the level of foreign born population much higher than the EU average?

The first issue to address is whether Britain is somehow exceptional and has disproportionately higher levels of foreign born population living in the country. The answer is an unequivocal no. The UK and Germany had very similar levels of foreign-born inhabitants (12.3% and 12.4% respectively) as a percentage of the overall population in 2013. The latest figures would probably be around 14% for the UK but larger for Germany, following the entry of over 1 million refugees in 2015, an issue which I have written about.

The percentage of foreign-born populations in the UK is relatively modest compared with many EU countries such as Luxemburg (42.4%) and Cyprus (23.2%), well as others such as Belgium (15.7%), Ireland (16%), Austria (16.1%), Sweden (15.4%), etc. Indeed, given Britain’s not so distant colonial past, the level of foreign born population in the UK could have been a lot higher. At the same time, it is not only foreigners that have been beating a path to the UK. Historically speaking, a very large number of Britons emigrated to the rest of the world, especially the Commonwealth countries, though there is far less concern about British emigration as about immigration into the UK.

Focusing on the role of the EU migration and thus on the freedom of movement of people, the EU cannot be held responsible for any migration to Britain prior to joining the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1973. Until then, Britain was entirely in charge of its immigration policies and the pattern of immigration reflected its colonial past and the rules established by successive British administrations.

The freedom of movement of people is one of the four economic freedoms that form the basis of the EU: free movement of goods, services, labour and capital. By voting in a referendum in 1975 to join what is now the EU, the British people accepted these four economic freedoms. The freedom of movement and residence for persons in the EU as one of the cornerstones of the EU was established by the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992 but the data show that the flow of EU citizens to the UK was a trickle until 2004, when larger numbers started to come to the UK.

Are Britain’s Borders out of control because of the EU?

Over time, the EU has grown to 28 member countries, a process that successive British governments have supported enthusiastically until recently. There is always a possibility that people will flow from lower income/employment economies to higher income/employment ones. This is the very reason why EU transitional provisions exist to restrict the flow of people from new member countries to the rest of the EU for a period of up to 7 years. This applied to Spain, Portugal, Ireland, etc. when they joined to the EU then Poland, Slovakia, etc. then Bulgaria and Romania (until 01 January 2014) and it applies to Croatia, the latest country to join the EU, until 2020. Each member country has a choice of either sticking with the 7 year transition or not. Thereafter the EU freedom of movement of people and workers applies in full to the new EU member countries.

The evidence shows that there was not a significant flow of people from the EU to the UK until 2004. Until that point the overwhelming majority of immigration to the UK reflected the policy of the British government, which in turn reflected Britain’s colonial heritage and its agreements with Commonwealth countries, as well as a strong flow of students to the country. These are not something which the EU interferes with. They are national decisions that Britain makes.

Furthermore, two issues reinforced the UK’s ability to influence migratory flows to the UK:

  • Schengen Agreement: this created the EU’s borderless space, enabling passport-free movement across most of the EU bloc. However, the UK opted out of the Schengen Agreement and unlike most EU countries, its borders remain intact and passports are essential to gain entry;
  • Britain is an island: unlike most other EU countries which have no internal borders and thus people can cross former borders unimpeded (this is changing following the 2015 refugee crisis), this is not the case in the UK. As an island, it has defensible natural and other borders. There are few entry points and every person seeking entry is checked by the UK authorities.

Therefore, the notion often repeated by the media and “Leave” politicians that Britain has “uncontrolled borders” because of the EU and its freedom of movement of people is little more than a fib. It has opted out of Schengen, it has natural borders and migrants can only come in via three routes: the Channel tunnel, the harbours and the airports, all of which under the exclusive control of the UK Border Force. It is only the people that are allowed in (or manage to sneak in) that get through.  This is the exclusive preserve of the British government. What it cannot hinder is the freedom of movement of EU citizens (once the transition period is over). However, this cuts both ways: Britons can and do leave the EU to other EU countries in large numbers.

If Britain is an island and is able to check every single passport of every single person coming into the country, you might well pause to ask what is so uncontrollable about the UK’s borders, other than EU related migration? Whose fault is that and is the EU element a reason to leave the EU?

Why did EU migration increase and is it detrimental to Britons?

The UK government (and Ireland and Sweden) chose to forego the EU transition arrangements and opted to remove the restrictions on labour market access from the onset of the EU enlargement in 2004. Other nations gradually followed suit, but like the UK, did not have to for 7 years. Germany and Austria restricted labour market access to the maximum period allowed.

EU-8 is the term used to denote the 10 countries that joined the EU in 2004 (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Malta, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia), excluding Cyprus and Malta. The UK decided of its own volition and with its national interests in mind, to allow the citizens of the EU-8 countries to live and work in Britain immediately. The rationale at the time was clear: Britain’s economy was booming and both the government and the private sector were concerned about a possible overheating labour market. The problem was solved by suspending the EU’s 7 year rule. Citizens from the EU-8 responded to the invitation to come to the UK, exactly as hoped by British authorities and industry. The key issue, however, was that neither foresaw just how many would choose to take-up the offer to come and work in the UK and Ireland.

But this was not an issue as the economy kept growing and all boats kept rising with the tide of employment and wealth being generated. British companies, British tax payers and British citizens benefited from the contribution of a young, healthy, educated, willing and industrious new source of labour.  When the double-whammy of deep recession and financial crisis hit, leading to unemployment and reductions in wages, the gear was thrown into reverse. History has a habit of repeating itself. The call for “British Jobs for British Workers!” was soon be heard, as well as increasing levels of criticism of Central European migrants, which then transmuted into criticism of the EU, the freedom of movement of people, Britain’s uncontrolled borders, etc. This was followed swiftly by the rise of UKIP as a political force, leading to a decision by the Conservative Party to cap net immigration at 100,000 per annum and culminating in the decision to hold a referendum on whether to remain in the EU or not on 23 June 2016.

The hardening of public attitudes in respect to EU immigration specifically since 2008/9 only makes sense if the EU migrants, and more especially the recent arrivals from the EU-8 countries, have been taking-up jobs which the British population would have otherwise have had, thus leading to higher levels of unemployment among the native population, as well as depressing their wages.

The evidence is that there are two types of EU migrant: those from “old” Europe (EU-15 such as France, Germany and Italy) who are slightly younger and more highly educated than the average Brit and those from “new” Europe (EU-8) who are much younger and also better educated than the average Briton. The old Europe migrants tend to find more highly skilled work than the average Briton. However, the new Europe migrants, partly because of the lack of language skills, found work mainly in low-skill, low-paid jobs such as skilled trades, construction and services jobs.

The evidence is that neither the “old” nor the “new” EU migrants put pressure on the wage and job prospects of the native British population. A review of various UK studies shows that there has been no, a small negative or a small positive labour market effect (wages, unemployment, etc.) in destination countries such as UK, while the long run impact is thought to be very small or none. By contrast, “old” EU migration has resulted in an increase in human capital, leading to higher productivity while also having a positive effect on British GDP.

The consistent conclusion from research into the labour market effects is that migration from the EU has been beneficial to the UK economy.

Is the EU freedom of movement a one way street?

It might be quite hard for some to comprehend this, but not all roads lead to London and the south east. The EU’s freedom of movement of people (as well as goods, services, capital) is a remarkable gift: it allows all EU citizens to travel across 28 countries (31 when Switzerland, Luxemburg and Lichtenstein are counted) to study, work, retire, au pair or just enjoy the richness of Europe whenever and as often as they like without “let or hindrance”, something which Britons should appreciate since these very words are engraved in our passports.

Many, if not most Britons, enjoy some or all of these freedoms in one way or another, not least in terms of their holidays. Indeed, 2.2 million Britons, such as me, have chosen to work, study, invest (e.g. holiday and retirement homes and pension funds) or retire in EU countries not least Spain (just over 1 million), France (330,000), Ireland (329,000), Germany (107,000), Cyprus (65,000), the Netherlands (48,000), Greece (45,000), Portugal (39,000) and Italy (37,000). It is not possible to claim anything other than that the UK and its citizens have taken full advantage of the freedom of movement of people in the EU: the numbers of Britons living in the EU almost balances the EU citizens living in the UK (2.3 million). Despite the somewhat hypocritical stance of many Britons towards the EU freedom of movement of people, this right is something which is taken for granted by a very large number of them, especially the elites that control the British media and the political parties (it would be good to know just how many of them own a holiday home and/or how frequently they holiday in the rest of the EU). Leaving the EU would be a double-edged sword for Britain.

Is the level of EU migration to the UK unstoppable?

Chart 1 Migration 1991 - 2014

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Source: Migration Statistics, House of Commons Library, Briefing Paper, 2015

Chart 1 shows immigration, emigration and net migration in the UK. During 1991 – 2014 immigration increased rapidly from 329,000 to 632,000. Emigration also increased from 285,000 to 319,000. Net migration (those arriving minus those leaving), increased from an annual average of 37,000 during 1991 – 1995 to an annual average of 232,000 during 2010 – 2014; this represented a significant and sustained increase in the level of migration.

However, the majority of immigration is not from EU countries, as the Table illustrates for 2014.

Table 1 Immigration 2014

Source: Migration Statistics, House of Commons Library, Briefing Paper, 2015

Historically, EU migration to the UK has been relatively low: during the period before the British government chose to allow EU-8 countries to enter Britain in advance of the 7 year transition period, EU migration accounted for 12.9% of all migration.

By 2014, 41.8% of annual immigration was attributable to the EU’s freedom of movement of people. However, the majority of migrants to the UK remain Brits returning home (12.8%) or non-EU nationals (45.4%). The decision by the UK to allow close to 60% of migrants to enter is not to do with the EU in any way, shape or form.

Of the 41.8% of the EU nationals entering the UK in 2014, almost half (20.4%) were from the EU-15 or “old” Europe such as Germany, Italy and France. As previously discussed, these are typically extremely well-educated, professional individuals who the British economy relies on to succeed and thrive. 12.7% of EU migrants were from the EU-8 such as Poland and Slovakia. The rest, 8.7% are from the rest of the EU, which is mostly Romania and Bulgaria. These are less well educated but still outperform the British average.

On this basis, although EU migration to the UK is undoubtedly significant, it is beneficial to the economy and only 21.4% of overall migration is from countries that Britons have become sensitive to in recent years. The UK could reduce the levels of migration from non-EU countries (45.4%) overnight, if it chose to do so, without reference to the EU or anyone else. Presumably it prefers not to hinder Britons from returning home, students paying pretty good money into the British higher education system or close-off access by Commonwealth countries (or presumably cut-off the supply of highly skilled employees from “old” Europe).

The rest (from the EU-8 and EU-2) amounts to 21.4% of the immigration experienced in 2014 or about 1 in five of the migrants entering the country. Is this worth leaving the EU in order to stop this group from the EU entering the country? And is it worth doing so despite the evidence that such migration does not depress wages and does not reduce the employment prospects of native Britons? I don’t think so, despite the media negativity and the claims of UKIP and Leave faction.

However, it might possibly be worth it if the EU citizens, whether from old or new Europe, were in the UK specifically to take-up the social benefits, rather than coming to work and thus contribute to the British economy. I shall address the issue of EU “benefit tourism” in the next post.

The EU immigration debate – much heat, little light

Migration from the EU was relatively low until 2004 when the UK decided, in its own interest, to allow immigration from the EU-8 accession countries such as Poland a full 7 years before the EU transition period officially required it. The UK benefited greatly from this decision, as did the many migrants that responded to the UK’s invitation: they did not come illegally to Britain. When the economic and financial crises struck, the mood turn ugly in the UK towards migrants generally, and those from the EU specifically. The freedom of movement of people is routinely criticised but the facts are that Britain has opted out of the Schengen Agreement, is an island and is in full charge of policing its own borders and deciding who comes into the country, not the EU. The latest information shows that immigration is running high but 12.8% are either Britons returning home or non-EU nationals (45.4%), mostly from the Commonwealth countries, over which the UK has full control of but rightly, chooses not to stop.

This means that less than half (41.8%) of the UK immigration originates from the EU. But even here, the situation is not as simple as UKIP and the Leave campaign pretend. Almost half (20.4%) are from the “old” Europe comprising top professionals which the British economy depends upon. Only 12.7% are from the EU-8 such as Poland and Slovakia and 8.7% are from EU-2, namely Romania and Bulgaria. However, in both cases, the evidence is that they are neither reducing the wages nor the employment prospects of native Britons.

Furthermore 2.2 million Britons benefit from the EU freedom of movement of people compared with 2.3 million EU citizens living in the UK. A decision to leave the EU would be a double edged sword for Britain, since it not only benefits economically from EU immigration, but also exports pensioners, student and workers to other parts of the EU.

Is this a case of the British media and populists politicians eating the EU cake and having it too? Form your own opinion.

  • Is the EU responsible for the overall level of foreign born population in the UK: No
  • Is the British government responsible for its own borders and the majority of migration in the UK: Yes
  • Should I vote to leave the EU because of the EU freedom of movement: No

© Ricardo Pinto, 2016, AngloDeutsch™ Blog, www.AngloDeutsch.EU


In Praise of Freedom of Movement of People in the European Union

MoveMapper™ helps you move to another country quickly and painlessly

MoveMapper Android App

In these days of mass movements of people connected with the refugee crisis, it is rare to find recognition of the European Union’s (EU) freedom of movement of people, let alone any commendations. Rather, the media and politicians tend to focus on the stresses and strains connected with migration and freedom of movement within the EU in general and the volume of refugees heading to Europe specifically. In this article, I argue against the grain of current discourse, fully acknowledging populists’ ability to set the tone of public opinion. I make the argument that the single most important achievement of the EU is the principle of freedom of movement of people across 28 countries. This fundamental right is under attack from many quarters. This article and the MoveMapper™ app presented below, represent my effort to counteract this trend. Freedom of movement of people has the capacity to improve people’s lives, while also raising standards of living for all. We should not allow it to be undermined by short-sighted, populist agendas.

The Nation State: freedom of movement lost

Before there were dukedoms, fiefdoms, principalities and eventually nation-states, human being roamed the earth and settled where they chose to. Freedom of movement of people existed in its purest sense: we could go anywhere we liked and the world was our oyster. After the establishment the nation state we became Germans, Britons and so on. Fences, borders, visas and other obstacles restricted the ability to live and work severely and the arena of life was telescoped into national boundaries except for a lucky few, such as diplomats, the military and the well-to-do.

The EU: freedom of movement regained

At the heart of the European Union (EU) is the establishment of a common market. This in turn required overcoming a number of restrictions and led directly to the establishment of the four fundamental freedoms at the core of the EU:

  • The free movement of goods: this right allows free flow of products between EU countries free of import/export duties/charges and common customs tariffs for non-EU countries;
  • The free movement of services (and of establishment): this ensures unrestricted rights to create firms/self-employment in any country and freedom to provide cross-border services;
  • The free movement of capital: this allows capital flows (finance, property, etc.) within the EU countries;
  • The free movement of people: this allows the relocation of citizens between EU 28 countries to pursue their activities, including the abolition of discrimination based on nationality.

The EU is dedicated to realising these four freedoms, subject to exceptions where a Member State can prove that they jeopardize a public good (e.g. public health) and are safeguarded by EU Treaty. Of the four freedoms, the most important to the 500+ million people living in the EU, is the freedom of movement of people throughout 28 countries (actually 32 in the European Economic Area countries, which includes Switzerland, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway).

Up-Close: Movement of People

For me, this is the most fundamental freedom and greatest achievement of the EU. It guarantees every EU/EEA citizen the right to move freely, visit, live, work and retire in any member state without restriction. It applies to all EU/EEA citizens, regardless of nationality and does away with discrimination in the common market. Furthermore, it ensures that certain rights can also be extended to the family members of the worker, including benefits, pensions, etc.

None of us believes that we should be disadvantaged in the labour market because of our religion, skin colour or other factors. This freedom means that discrimination on the basis of nationality, residence and/or language is not permitted, while also securing equal treatment in employment conditions, remuneration, dismissal and the receipt of social benefits.

If you believe in transparency and fair treatment, there is absolutely nothing that anyone should fear from the freedom of movement of people. On the contrary, this is an achievement that Europeans should be proud of.

The pros and cons: movement of the people

At the most basic level, the freedom of movement of people means that you and I have access to 32 EEA countries, as well as Switzerland, at the drop of a hat. Not only that, we have automatically the same rights (and responsibilities) as the citizens of those countries. What does this mean in practice?

  • You can visit all 31 countries when you like and as often as you like without cost, delay, restriction, etc.;
  • You can study / au pair, etc. in any of these countries using the same procedures and incurring the same costs as the national citizens of that country;
  • You can work in all countries without constraints or fear of discrimination due to nationality, residence, language, etc.;
  • You do not need a visa or a qualifying period before you can start working or your family can join you;
  • You can do not need to fear being treated differently in the form of the contract, holidays, wages, pension, benefits, etc. just because your nationality is different;
  • You can retire wherever you choose and transfer your pension without fear of being penalised or restricted by virtue of choosing to live in another EU/EEA country.

These fundamental rights are just the tip of the iceberg. Yet this degree of freedom to take greater control of your own destiny would have been considered to be a utopian dream not so long ago in Europe. It used to take hours to cross borders and the long, costly and uncertain bureaucratic nightmares involved in moving countries, getting a job, buying a property, establishing a company, etc. made it a remote dream, except for a small minority. No longer; this particular freedom have been hard won and it is worth fighting tooth and nail to retain.

The above are not the only benefits of the freedom of movement of people. It can play an important role in other respects, contributing to individual, national and EU well-being:

  • Ageing Population and pensions: the ageing population structure in the EU is a major challenge: of the 28 countries of the EU, only Ireland, France and the UK are remotely close to being able to replace their population. Politicians may seek to increase the female participation rate in the labour market and raise the pensionable age, however, the serious demographic challenge cannot be overcome without significant positive net migration for a sustained period of time, even beyond the levels currently being experienced due to the refugee crisis;
  • Reducing unemployment: some cities and regions of EU countries experience much higher levels of unemployment than others (e.g. London vs Liverpool). In the same vein, some countries experience higher levels of unemployment than others (e.g. Greece and Portugal vs Germany and the UK). If economies are growing and labour is attracted to more dynamic cities, regions or countries, this is advantageous to all concerned, not least the unemployed, their dependants, the employers, as well as the tax man;
  • Economic contribution: if economic growth is restricted due to lack of employees or absence of certain types of skill, a labour market of 500+ million makes it possible for economies to continue growing without overheating and resulting in recession. This applies not only to the top, professional jobs. Low paid, dirty, dangerous, dull, flexible and insecure work is the very type that many nationals of the wealthier EU countries are very content to leave to others.

There are few things in life that only entail benefits and no costs; freedom of movement of people is no different. The main potential disadvantages include the following:

  • Cheap Labour Depressing Wages: it is possible that inflows of people willing to take even lower pay than the going rate for certain jobs depresses the wage levels. However, the case either way (depressing or increasing wages) is hotly disputed by economists. Most studies find that there is almost no effect either way but many people remain fearful of this issue, especially the less educated/skilled;
  • Already High Unemployment Levels: it is possible that migrants will flow to areas with already high levels of unemployment. However, migratory flows have an internal logic – migrants want to find work, not to move from being unemployed in one location to being unemployed in yet another. As a rule, they seek out high employment areas because they want to work, they want to save and they want a shot at a better life for themselves;
  • Welfare Tourism: it is possible that a proportion of migrants will seek to improve their lives by migrating to a country offering higher social benefits in than in their own nation. However, research suggests that a tiny proportion of EU migrants fall into this category (less than 1% of all beneficiaries in six EU countries and 1%-5% in five others). Despite the great song and dance about this issue by the populists, no government has come up with any data corroborating the overblown claims of cross-border welfare tourism;
  • Brain drain: freedom of movement of people can lead to skilled people leaving countries that paid for their education and training to be benefit of the receiving country. This is certainly an issue for the emitting country. But there is also the prospect that many choose return to their country of origin, bringing with them higher levels of human capital, know-how, investment capital and an entrepreneurial mind-set that can contribute to national development.

While recognising the pros and cons involved, on balance, most conclude that the freedom of movement of people is a great boon for the individuals concerned, as well as for the emitting and receiving countries. Migration across localities, cities, regions and countries has the capacity to unleash economic development and raise living standards, while also delivering greater satisfaction and happiness at the individual level. It is not a one-way street, but it is worth defending.

The Reality: movement indirectly hampered

The reality however is that governments, to varying degrees, are sensitive to the issue of freedom of movement of people. While recognising the great potential and actual advantages of migration, politicians are extremely mindful of emotive public opinion. They are fully aware of the demographic ticking-bomb that is the ageing European society. But short-termism is inherent their profession (4-5 year election cycles) and populism (winning the next local / regional / national / European region election) is the name of their game. They and the media feed upon people´s concerns and fears, regardless of whether these are well-founded or not. Fear, not hope, is their basic working material.

The consequence is that none of the EU and EEA governments (the European Commission included) make it easy for people to get access to the information that they need to have a sound basis for deciding whether to move to another country or not. A lot of information is available, but it is fragmented, outdated, uncoordinated, etc. Moving to another country may be something that we consider but we usually do not get far. It takes weeks of research effort to connect up the fragmented dots and build a clear picture of what is involved in moving from one country to another with the EU. We typically lack the time, skills, energy and patience to do this.

Relatively few people make use of the single most precious gift of the EU to its 508 million citizens: only 11 million EU citizens have taken advantage of the right to live, study, work or retire in another EU country (or 2.2% of all people in 28 countries). It is clear that some countries are more attractive than others, but the low level of general migration within the EU is not something to fear and deny.

Moving people: MoveMapper™ app

Through the EU’s freedom of movement of people, we have almost utopian rights to live our lives how and where we want. If we choose to, we can change our minds and go back home and pick-up where we left off. I am a serial migrant. I have lived in several EU countries and worked in almost 40 countries worldwide. I have benefited enormously as a human being and as a professional. I do not fear migration or migrants. On the contrary, I embrace other cultures, languages, traditions, history, art, ideas, cuisine, and yes, also our differences and our sameness as human beings, whatever our skin colour, language or beliefs.

The beauty of the freedom of movement of people has inspired me to develop the MoveMapper™ app, which is designed to bring to together key information in deciding whether to work / study / au pair / retire, etc. in another EU country, starting with Britain and Germany.

The MoveMapper™ app covers the formalities of moving to another country, how to get accommodation, how to find employment, how to deal with financial issues, how to integrate your family, how to gain education / language skills and other issues. By pulling the relevant information together, the app provides you with the capacity to enrich your life.

I do not claim that this is a perfect app, that it has all the possible information or indeed that it is 100% up-to-date. The situation is constantly evolving and maintaining information is not easy.

But I believe that it will provide you with sufficient information with which to enable you to decide whether and how to take advantage of the EU’s greatest gift to its citizens. The rest is up to you.

The MoveMapper™ app offers information for two countries to start with: Britain and Germany, the countries closest to my heart and which form the focus of my blog: the AngloDeutsch Blog.

The free version can be tested for free. The premium version costs Euro 0,99 + VAT per country.

When the MoveMapper™ app generates sufficient interest and revenue, I plan to add other countries and update and improve the information available, as well as the app experience.

Test MoveMapper™. Rate it. Share it by forwarding it to people who might be interested.

Do not fear the freedom of movement of people within the EU; instead, recognise it for the incredible opportunity that it offers to those that choose to make use of it. This amounts to real power, real freedom to shape our lives and those of our families.

© Ricardo Pinto, 2016, AngloDeutsch™ Blog, www.AngloDeutsch.EU


To Brexit or not to Brexit: key issues for the EU Referendum

EU Referendum ahead

The British voter will soon be asked to decide on whether Britain will continue to have a future as part of the European Union (EU) or to exit it (i.e. Brexit or British Exist). The EU referendum’s date has not yet been fixed and must happen by 2017, but is widely speculated that it is going to be to be scheduled for mid-2016.

That question that will be put to the British voter is simple but fundamentally important, namely:

  • Should the United Kingdom remain a member of the European Union or leave the EU?

The options are either to:

  • Remain a member of the European Union or
  • Leave the European Union

This is a simple question with simple options, but it nevertheless is a historic referendum that will influence the future of the UK (and that of the EU itself) for generations to come.

Brexit the obvious solution?

I am a British citizen who lived, studied and worked in Britain. My parents, sibling and my closest friends remain in Britain. Nevertheless, during the last 20 years, I have lived and worked in numerous countries of the EU and elsewhere. I am married to a German and my business takes me regularly to different parts of the EU, potential future EU countries and beyond. I understand what the feeling is about the EU and that there is frustration with the way the EU is perceived to be interfering with British sovereignty and especially about the freedom of movement of people, which is widely seen to be adding to the social pressures in the country.

If I were about to cast a vote at the forthcoming EU referendum, I would feel apprehensive about it. If I were to believe what a hostile media and populist politicians stress, my gut reaction might be to vote for Brexit and leave the EU. I might not be greatly enamoured by the current state of the UK economy, the ongoing austerity, the decreasing wages and the job insecurity. I might well be hearing about the number of laws and regulations emanating from “Brussels”, which the shorthand for the EU, with the implication that Britain no longer controls its own borders and sovereignty. I might well be tempted to conclude that the EU is indeed to blame.

Furthermore, I might also be frustrated by my inability to get on to the first rang of the housing ladder while others point to migrants from the EU are taking up the supply of housing that I or my children want to make use of in our own country. This might lead me to concur with those that point to the “uncontrolled” borders and the EU migration caused by the freedom of movement of people. A similar argument is applied to the pressures in the health and education systems, and I might also be concerned about the “swarms” of EU migrants taking-up scarce resources that we are entitled to, since we are the ones who are actually paying the taxes while the others jump the queue and coin the market for social benefits.

In short, if I were to believe all of the above, I might be well disposed to giving “Europe” a bloody nose, just as populist politicians and the media are urging me to. I might vote to leave the EU: Britain was great on its own and can be once again.

The real issues

But the British voters are fair and reasonable. Rather than follow their gut reaction, they will want to balance both sides of the equation and be fair and dispassionate in making this historic decision. They will want answers to the following questions:

  • Is the negative portrayal of the EU and all the criticism connected with it correct?
  • Is it too simplistic to say that the EU is to blame for all the challenges in Britain?
  • Is Britain indeed so tied-up by the EU that it is no longer in charge of its own destiny?
  • Are there only costs to being one of 28 member of the EU?

If something sounds too simple to be true (it’s the EU, stupid!), then perhaps it is really is too good to be true. Simple solutions to complex problems are appealing but can the EU really be the fount of all of Britain’s ills and will the country really be better off immediately upon Brexit?

Looking at it through another lens, the fair-minded British voter might ask whether it is reasonable or not to only see “Europe”, “Brussels” and the “European Union” only in a negative light? Can it really be that Britain is only paying in but getting nought out of the EU? And, if things are not quite so black and white, what exactly are those positives that are so rare to hear about? Are the benefits so abstract that the ordinary voter simply cannot grasp them or related to them?

We all instinctively know that there are two sides to every story but the media and the loudest politicians do not excel at presenting the pros and cons. As a Brit with a foot on both camps, I hear a series of populist myths being peddled again and again. I often smell a red herring when I turn a newspaper pager. I often see the EU being used and abused by those who would attack a straw man.

So in making-up my mind about how to vote at the historic EU referendum, as a Brit, I would want to understand the costs as well as the benefits connected with the most important EU issues, namely:

EU costs
  • Is EU migration a good reason for Brexit?
  • Is EU benefit tourism a good reason for Brexit?
  • Is the housing crisis a good reason for Brexit?
  • Is EU health tourism a good reason for Brexit?
  • Are EU directives and regulations a good reason for Brexit?
  • Is the state of the education system a good reason for Brexit?
  • Is the EU the cause of austerity, low productivity and stagnating wages in the UK?
  • Is the UK paying more than its fair share and getting little out of the EU?
EU benefits
  • Is having the Euro (one currency in 19 countries out of 28) so bad?
  • Is being able to visit, study and work in 28 countries so bad?
  • Is being able to own a second home and retire in 28 countries so bad?
  • Is having common trade arrangements in 28 countries so bad?
  • Is having common environmental standards in 28 countries so bad?
  • Is having common consumer protection in 28 countries so bad?
  • Is reducing the time, stress, cost, etc. across 28 countries so bad?
  • Is the EU undemocratic, out of touch and beyond reform?
Key issues

 

  • Is Britain better or worse off within the EU?
  • Is the EU better or worse off with Britain in the EU?
  • Are you better off with Britain in the EU or not?

Questions and Answers

If I were the average voter, I would want an answer to these questions before casting my vote.

I would also want the answers to be simple, short and to the point but backed-up by evidence.

This is exactly what the AngloDeutsch Blog will seek to do from until the referendum.

This will be a challenge, given my professional and other commitments, but I shall do my best to cover as many of these topics as I can over the next few months, starting with the EU’s freedom of movement of people.

Dr Ricardo Pinto, AngloDeutsch™ Blog, www.AngloDeutsch.EU, 13 February 2016


The refugee backlash – pulling-up the European drawbridge

© Ricardo Pinto, 2016, AngloDeutsch™ Blog, www.AngloDeutsch.EU

2015 was another tumultuous year for Europe. Over a million refugees found their way into the European Union (EU), but already a new dynamic is evident in early 2016: the refugee backlash has begun and Europe is pulling-up the drawbridge on refugees and economic migrants. The broad contours of the dynamic evident can be summarised as follows:

  • The EU countries have accepted too many and cannot continue to absorb refugees at the same rate;
  • Germany was irresponsible in allowing so many refugees;
  • Without proper checks, the refugee will include a radical element that will pose a threat to the EU´s security, as illustrated by the terrifying Paris bombings in November 2015;
  • Once in Germany, or wherever, they will spread to other parts of the EU, so the freedom of movement of people principle may need to be looked at again;
  • Further sexual assaults on women and robberies by young men from “the African or North African region” are to be expected following the shameful New Year’s Eve experiences in Cologne, Hamburg and other cities;
  • The current levels of migration will destroy Europe as we know it; the borders must close, only legitimate applications up to a predetermined cap can be accepted and the rest sent back.

This all seems logical and it plays well as a populist theme. This certainly applies to parties such as the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) in Germany and the UK Independence Party (UKIP), but it also goes down equally well with the mainstream political parties such as the Conservative Party in the UK and the CDU and especially CSU in Germany. This is without even mentioning the more radical right wing movements that exist throughout Europe. Not surprisingly, shrill criticism of the migration issue and the EU’s apparent inability to manage the situation is particularly evident in the UK, as it gears up for the forthcoming referendum (the exact date of which has not yet been announced) on whether to remain in the EU or not.

It is very difficult to unpack and analyse what is clearly a highly emotive theme, let alone have a sensible debate about it, which is the very reason why certain political parties are making hay with the refugee issue. Previously, their favourite theme was the Eurozone/Greece crisis, now it is migration but the overall gloom and doom narrative does not change very much.

I should stress that there are clearly legitimate public concerns throughout Europe about the migration issue, both within the EU and from outside. However, the use of scare tactics to gain political or other advantage is not something I enjoy witnessing so I aim to address a sub-set of issues, such as Germany’s alleged irresponsible behaviour, the argument that Europe simply cannot cope and the refugee backlash that is in full swing before the first month of 2016 is finished.

The blame game

I will start with Germany’s role in the European refugee crisis. There is certainly a messy situation, but did Germany act irresponsibly in 2015?

Any way you choose to cut it, Germany has played the key role in the refugee crisis. Germany accepted 1.1 million refugees in 2015, a number than could rise further on by the time the counting is official. Germany had in any case been experiencing significant flows of migrants, mainly from the EU. For the last few years this has been running at over 400,000 net migrants per year. Add this up and Germany received at least 1.5 million net migrants last year, which is an astonishing figure. Furthermore, under the German asylum law, refugees may be allowed to bring their family members, resulting in a significant and unquantifiable flow connected with 2015.

By any reasonable criteria Germany has been an incredibly good country to accept so many people. This is not just about the cost involved, which is undoubtedly significant albeit one which Germany is in a position to absorb. Being a good country is first and foremost about the willingness to recognise the human suffering cause by the migration crisis and to try to do something about it, rather than turning a blind eye to it all.

The contrast with many other EU countries could not be greater. Countries such as the UK have agreed to accept 5,000 Syrian refugees per year for the next five years. It has to be borne in mind that even this paltry number was only agreed to following a public outcry from British citizens appalled by their government’s hard heartedness, which bounced Parliament into agreeing to do more.

Germany is not alone in being a good country: about 90% of the refugees have been accepted by three countries out of 28 in the EU: Germany, Sweden and Austria. What about the response of the other 25 countries of the EU?  Following months of unedifying political squabbling, which continues to this day, the best they could come-up with was to agree to relocate 160,000 asylum seekers from Greece and Italy over the next two years: this is an average of 5,700 per country over two years, though very few of these transfers have actually occurred so far (less than 500 were achieved in 2015 and only 3 out of 10 “hot spots” have opened according to some estimates).

Is “pitiful” too strong a word to summarise the EU’s collective failure in the face of a mass humanitarian crisis? I don’t think so. It is not the first time that the EU has failed miserably to stand up to be counted and it will almost certainly not be the last. It is not as if the refugee crisis was some sudden, unexpected act of god; this is the result of steadily growing pressure and reaching its natural and inevitable conclusion. There was nothing about it that could not have been predicted by the civil servants of the European Commission or of the EU member states.

Germany’s decision to act more or less unilaterally in accepting 1.1 million refugees must be seen in the following context:

  1. This is the worst crisis since WW2: the number of forcibly displaced people, often due to wars, reached almost 60 million worldwide at the end of 2014, including over 14 million refugees. This was an increase of about 25% compared to the previous year and is mostly due civil war, violence and oppression in Syria, Eritrea, Afghanistan, Somalia, Iraq, etc. although other regions, including northern Africa and the Balkans, are also major sources of migrants (IMF, 2016 / The Refugee Surge in Europe: Economic Challenges). This is nothing short of a mass human tragedy, which Europe is neither immune to nor can afford to simply turn its back on. Globalisation entails many new developments, including the capacity of large numbers of people to move in the direction of Europe. It may take time, but sooner or later, it does reach Europe.
  2. This was not a crisis of Germany’s making: it did not chose to invade Iraq in 2003 and played little or no part in setting in chain a series of events which have destabilised parts of the Middle East, in an attempt to bring about democracy through regime change. Of all the European nations it is the UK, France and Italy (together with the USA) that bear the greatest responsibility for any resulting instability in the region. All are now conspicuous for their efforts to obfuscate causality and deny moral or other responsibility (if you break something, you should fix it) to deal with the resulting mess that they helped to set in chain.
  3. The EU failed spectacularly: the utter inability of the EU to find common ground in dealing with the huge volume of people heading towards Europe is what resulted in Germany’s more or less unilateral action. Just as in the Greek/Eurozone crises, it is proving extremely difficult for 28 countries to make decisions quickly and act in unison. This should not be in the least bit surprising. The EU is very far from being a United States of Europe; this simply reflects the fact that the nation-state is alive and well within the EU, despite exaggerated claims of its demise. Each nation retains the ability to follow its own mandate and block changes that it does not agree with. The Central European (Visegrad countries) and Western Balkans states have made their views crystal clear in respect to taking a share of the refugees, but they are not alone. Just as in the case of Greece and the Eurozone, finding a common solution to an unexpected large-scale problem is a slow, messy and costly process. In the end, to misquote slightly the famous words: Europeans Will Always Do the Right Thing — After Exhausting All the Alternatives. The 28 nation states plus the various Candidate Countries (i.e. Western Balkans including Turkey) will find an imperfect compromise and Germany will pay a disproportionate amount of the cost arising. Such is the iron rule of the EU. No other scenario is possible if 28+ nations are to continue to play broadly for the same team. How many other international agreements are you aware of that take a couple of weeks or months to resolve? Climate change agreements? International trade agreements? These things take years or decades, not weeks or months to sort out and are always and everywhere an uneasy compromise. 28+ countries finding a way to deal with the worst humanitarian crisis in 70 years takes time but in 2015, time was of the essence where people are involved, rather than just economics.

Cometh the hour, cometh the country: Germany chose not to sit on its hands but to act in alleviating the growing pressure along the Turkish-Greek-Balkan-Central European corridor.

Refugees in Miratovac, close to the border between Serbia and Macedonia. Photo by Djordje Savic / EPA

Refugees in Miratovac, close to the border between Serbia and Macedonia. Photo by Djordje Savic / EPA

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

You are free to form your own opinion about whether Germany has acted irresponsibly or not. I personally think that not only has Germany acted incredibly responsibly, but as tax payer and resident of the country, I am proud of living in such a country. No doubt, Germany has already changed as a result and ordinary Germans are deeply unsettled about the implications, an issue which I plan to write about in the future. This is a reflection, among other issues of the fact that the scale of the problem is so great that no country can possibly solve it all on its own – not even Germany.

Europe Cannot Cope! Really?

The next issue is whether Germany and/or Europe have relevant experience and if they can absorb the numbers of refugees.

For a start, I can distinctly remember (since I was part of it) a small, poor, broken European country of 8.5 million absorbing about 1 million people from its former colonies during the mid- to late-1970s. While there are major differences with the current situation (common language, culture, religion, etc.), Portugal was not part of the EU but absorbed those numbers and did not collapse despite its politically chaotic and economically precarious post-colonial situation at the time. In fact, it thrived as a result of the influx. Don’t get me wrong: I am not suggesting that Europe should fling open its doors to all and sundry with no questions asked, but I am saying that Europe is much more robust than many would seem to believe.

After a short-lived spike of international approval for its decision to take on the refugees, Germany has since reaped criticism, direct and indirect, most of which has been leveled at Angela Merkel, the Germany Chancellor. The gist of the argument is that she has gambled Germany’s long term interests for personal hubris: she wanted to cap her career with a Nobel Peace Prize and/or improve Germany’s international image after the Greek crisis. Others of a more analytical bent sought instead to justify Germany’s actions (and presumably the inaction of their own governments) by pointing to Germany’s ageing population structure. It seems to me that almost all 28 EU countries are suffering from the same problem, albeit to varying degrees. Did others facing the same demographic situation jump to take their share of refugees? I don’t think so.

It is certainly true that Germany and many EU countries have a rapidly ageing population structure (fertility of around 1.5, which is below the replacement rate of 2.1) that would greatly benefit from significant immigration of the scale that happened during 2015. But I take issue with the implication that the German authorities naively failed to foresee the likely stresses and strains that would be generated by taking so many refugees in one year (the estimate at the time was 800,000 – 1 million refugees). The reality is that Europe generally and Germany specifically have plenty of experience of large scale refugee crises and indeed of Muslims culture.

Firstly, Germany has a large number of Muslims. According to the 2011 Population Census, there are just under 6.2 million foreigners in Germany and Turks alone accounted for the largest group (1.5 million people or 24.4%). In all, some 2.5 million people are of Turkish origin. It is not as though Germany is not aware of the stresses and strains associated with the religion, gender, education, labour market and other dimensions connected with integrating populations, including Muslims. The same applies to many countries of the EU but unlike others, it still went ahead with what is often described by its critics as its “open door” policy.

Secondly, it was not so long ago that Germany had to respond to a refugee crisis of similar proportion. During the 1990s, a large number of asylum applications were lodged due to crisis in the ex-Yugoslavia, though the peak of that crisis in 1991 (around 700,000) has been exceeded in 2015 (see first Figure below). That said the second Figure below illustrates the point that the numbers were relatively low compared to those of the 1990s, though the diagram does not take the 2015 influx of over a million refugees into consideration. It is probably not a coincidence that then, as now, Germany absorbed the lion’s share of refugees.


IMF graphic 2016

Source: IMF, 2016, p.11

Thirdly, to put things in context, Europe had only absorbed 1 out of the 14 million refuges worldwide in 2014 and this increased to 2 million in 2015. Whoever believes that what has happened in 2015 is the end of the matter and that the EU can simply put-up the fences, close the borders and turn its back on the rest of the world is deluded. A proportion of the 12 million other displaced people are heading our way in 2016 and beyond: the current estimate is that another 1 million will aim for the EU this year and possibly more. The way to end this catastrophe is not by pulling-up the drawbridge to Fortress Europe; if the conflicts in the countries in question are ended and if this is combined with a major reconstruction programme, in time, the human tragedy and the migratory process will also abate. Putting-up fences and closing borders will restrict some of the flow, but will also add to the human desperation without actually dealing with the root cause.

To conclude, in my view Germany did not saunter into the current situation blithely and Mrs Merkel was right in saying “Wir schaffen das.” We can do it: I agree with her. Other, much smaller and poorer countries have in the part or are currently absorbing the same or higher numbers of refugees. Germany knew, more or less, the implications of opening its borders to about a million refugees, even if the general public could not have predicted the exact consequences, including the outrages in Cologne and other cities. It is most unlikely that Europe’s pre-eminent politician would not have sniffed the potential political, social, religious and cultural implications of undertaking such a radical step. The numbers absorbed by Europe are relatively small by comparison with the numbers being absorbed by other countries, including Turkey. If they can do it, so can Europe. Indeed, a cursory reading of European history proves that it has coped with wave after wave of migration.

Refugee backlash

To ask if the refugee backlash is coming would be to pose the wrong question: it is already here.

The mood in Germany and the rest of Europe started turning ugly long before the Paris terrorist attacks and the mass sexual and other crimes in Cologne and other German cities during the New Year’s Eve celebrations that went wrong. Pensioners are up in arms about the way they perceive their country is changing. Parents are concerned about their children’s education as gymnasia are requisitioned as temporary accommodation and class rooms begin to take the strain of absorbing the influx of non-German speakers. House prices and rent levels are being pushed up in an overheating housing market where affordable accommodation is scarce.  Region and local authorities remain deeply concerned about practical matters in addition to shelter, such as state benefits and labour market opportunities for refugees. The issue of integration and whether it is possible to achieve or not, is “the” topic of conversation. This applies to Germany and it applies equally to other EU countries.

Angela Merkel has gone from being Europe’s pre-eminent politician and practically politically unassailable in Germany, to being under siege. Make no mistake about it; she is fighting for her political future.  Yet despite the ratcheting of pressure, even today, she is refusing to put a cap of the number of refugees that will be accepted by Germany in future (the CSU is openly advocating a cap of 200,000 per annum, which itself puts the UK’s response in the shade). There are probably two reasons for this. Firstly, German asylum law is based on individual assessments so caps would not be workable without changing the law (but we know laws can be changed at the drop of a political hat). Secondly, the huge numbers of forcibly displaced people out there (14 million and counting) are desperate and there is no end to their travails in prospect. What would you do in their shoes? Which safe harbour would you try to reach, possibly at the cost of perishing on the way? A cap would be a meaningless promise without a workable EU arrangement.

Mrs Merkel is displaying the hallmark of true leadership: political courage and acknowledging moral duties beyond her nation’s borders. That is the essence of being responsible in a European and global sense, though I recognise fully that many would much rather put national and personal interest before anything else, including in Germany.

Merkel probably expected the rest of Europe, especially the largest countries, most of which have had more than a hand in the unfolding disaster in the Middle East, to take a much greater share of the humanitarian burden. Despite the lessons of Greece, she has miscalculated in relation to most of the EU and is now in the middle of the biggest political crisis that she has ever faced. She also appears to have greatly overestimated the Greek and Turkish capacity to manage their borders.

But she is nothing if not a pragmatic leader. She has recognised that the whirlwind is not just gathering, it is already blowing. A change has already been signaled that 2016 will not be the same as 2015. The scale of the challenge means that Germany cannot shoulder the burden mostly on its own for much longer. All three of the most generous countries have introduced border visa checks (three others have also and many more are threatening to do the same). A closure of national borders has so far been resisted by the EU, but this could change. Sweden has announced that 80,000 of the 160,000 refugees it accepted will be sent back because they are economic migrants, not refugees. The EU has reinforced the message by stating that 60% of the applicants are not refugees at all but economic migrants mainly from the Balkans and North African countries such as Morocco and Tunisia. It has also threatened to suspend Greece from Schengen for systematic failures in the migrant crisis. In turn Greece is pointing its finger at Turkey for allowing migrants to “swamp” their border and islands.  Reports are piling up that in addition to anti-refugee demonstrations and hostels being set on fire in Germany, violence is erupting in Sweden and other countries.

A common EU approach is the only way forward, combined with a serious and concerted effort to end the conflicts and reconstruct economies, since these are the drivers of mass population displacement. But just like the Greek and Eurozone crises, which are also far from over, it will not happen miraculously or overnight.

So, get ready for a much more hard-nosed European approach to the refugee crisis, with an emphasis on only accepting people from conflict zones (true refugees and asylum seekers) and rejecting all others (i.e. economic migrants). The EU drawbridge is being pulled-up. The wider societal backlash is already underway and those that are leading it will not be pausing to distinguish those that deserve to be helped from those that do not.